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175 
Families and Federalism 
Sylvia Law* 
This subject is vast, and for most people, family is the most 
meaningful element of their lives: more important than work, wealth, 
or status.1 Families are also a rich source of fascinating legal conflict. 
In the prime time TV line-up, families and family law provide weekly 
fodder for Judging Amy and Family Law, not to mention Rosie, 
Oprah, and countless other programs. Federalism—the balance of 
power between state and federal governments—is not even a blip on 
the radar screen of pop culture or ordinary human values.2 In the law, 
however, federalism is big news. In the past few years, the Supreme 
Court has revolutionized the balance of state and federal power, and 
sharply limited the power of Congress.3 
Cases at the intersection of federalism and family law are often in 
 
 * Professor, New York University Law School. This Article is based on a presentation 
by Professor Law in the Public Interest Law Speaker Series at Washington University School of 
Law on March 22, 2000. Susan Frelich Appleton, Associate Dean and Lemma Barkeloo and 
Phoebe Couzins Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law, has been my family 
law mentor for many years as co-author, with Professor Kelly Weisberg, of MODERN FAMILY 
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS. It is a magnificent casebook and Dean Appleton is always 
willing to provide teachers prompt and wise guidance on hard questions. She encouraged me to 
do this project and helped throughout. 
 Two research assistants—Susan Dorsey at the University of Hawaii Richardson School of 
Law and Kristin Corapi at NYU Law School—provided traditional research help with 
extraordinary skill and brought a critical intelligence to the project. Leslie Jenkins, my assistant 
at NYU Law, provided vital support services.  
 Several colleagues read earlier drafts of the Article and provided perceptive comments, 
including Martin Guggenheim, Judith Resnik, Avi Soifer, and Joan Williams. Thanks to all. 
 1. PHILLIP BLUMSTEIN & PEPPER SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN COUPLES: MONEY, WORK, 
SEX 164-74 (1984); Richard Powers, American Dreaming, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 7, 2000, at 
67 (discussing a random sample of 1,003 adults asked “Which do you think shows more of who 
you really are: your role at home or your role at work?” Seventy-five percent of respondents 
said role at home, 17% said role at work, and 8% did not work.). 
 2. Federalism issues surfaced powerfully in public debate during the dispute following 
the Presidential election of 2000. However, the issues, while vitally important, were narrowly 
focused. 
 3. Appendix 1 briefly describes the Supreme Court’s recent constitutional decisions 
about federalism. Appendix 2 briefly describes the Court’s const itutional decisions concerning 
families.  
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the public eye. Who should decide the fate of Elian Gonzales, for 
example: Florida family courts, U.S. immigration authorities, federal 
courts, or Congress?4 Should grandparents have a right to visit 
grandchildren over the objection of parents, and who should make 
that decision: state courts and legislatures or the U.S. Supreme 
Court?5 Does violence against women violate federally protected 
civil rights and sufficiently impact interstate commerce such that 
Congress may provide a remedy to supplement ordinary state 
criminal law?6 Should states or Congress decide the fate of frozen 
embryos when the man and woman who created the embryo 
disagree?7 
This Article does not attempt to provide a comprehensive survey 
of either family law or federalism. Nor does it address the substantive 
constitutional principles that sometimes govern family law8 or the 
fascinating questions of congressional power and state immunity that 
presently occupy the Supreme Court.9 This Article acknowledges that 
 
 4. When Elian Gonzalez was found clinging to an inner tube on Nov. 25, 1999, after his 
mother and ten others drowned in their flight from Cuba, the U.S. Immigration and 
Naturalization Service originally announced that state courts should resolve his status in the 
United States as a matter of state custody law. Attorney General Janet Reno later explained: 
As the case evolved, it became clear that Elian’s father, who was still in Cuba, was 
asserting a parental relationship with Elian and had adequately expressed his wish, 
under the immigration laws, for Elian’s petition for admission to this country to be 
withdrawn. In these circumstances, I.N.S. was obliged to determine whether the father 
was the appropriate person to speak for Elian on immigration issues. That question . . . 
remains one of federal, not state, law.  
Excerpts From Reno’s Letter on Cuban Boy, N.Y. T IMES, Jan. 13, 2000, at A14. The federal 
courts upheld the INS claim that a six-year-old child can ordinarily only apply for asylum 
through a parent and that this general rule applies to Cuban parents. Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d 
1338 (11th Cir. 2000).  
 5. In Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000), the Supreme Court grappled with these 
questions. The six opinions are delphic and largely leave resolution to state courts and 
legislatures. See Sylvia A. Law, Rulings on Abortion and Grandparents’ Visitation, 22 NAT’L 
L. J. (Aug. 7, 2000), at A26. See infra Appendix 2. 
 6. In United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000) the Court held, 5-4, that 
Congress lacks power to provide federal civil remedies for gender based violence. See infra 
Appendix 1. 
 7. With 150,000 frozen embryos in the United States, it is not surprising that couples’ 
plans change and conflicts arise. Carey Goldberg, Massachusetts Case is Latest to Ask Court to 
Decide Fate of Frozen Embryos, N.Y. T IMES, Nov. 5, 1999, at A20.  
 8. But see Appendix 2. 
 9. But see Appendix 1. 
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in the academic world, constitutional law is King and family law is 
Cinderella’s stepsister.10 Analysis of constitutional issues is robust, 
while, at the same time, family law is under-theorized. Therefore, this 
Article focuses on family law and policy, not constitutional 
principles, and explores the ways in which federal authority over 
family law has been exercised. This Article asks: When, as a matter 
of common sense, experience, and public policy, should family law 
issues be resolved as a matter of federal, rather than state law? Many 
political actors confront this question today. Advocates ask Congress 
to decide whether a federal response to a family law question is 
desirable, and the Supreme Court, in interpreting the act of Congress, 
must choose between deference to state discretion and affirmation of 
federal authority. 
Many federal laws affect families, from farm subsidies and 
minimum wage laws to the treatment of our military forces. The most 
consequential and pervasive forms of federal regulation of family 
relations are the rules defining eligibility for cash assistance, 
including tax exemptions, welfare, Social Security, Medicaid, 
Medicare, support services for the disabled, Food Stamps and other 
subsidies. These federal rules proscribe when family relations give 
rise to an obligation to support or a claim for benefit. The impact of 
each of these programs on family relations is complex and invites 
extensive analysis. This Article focuses more narrowly on core issues 
that define family law as that which “determines what constitutes a 
family and who is or may become a spouse, parent, child, or other 
family member; . . . the legal creation and dissolution of these family 
relationships; . . . [and] the legal rights and responsibilities that 
family members have because of their familial status.”11 
 
 10. Deborah Jones Merritt, Interpreting Legal Citations: A Symposium Sponsored by the 
West Group: Scholarly Influence in a Diverse Legal Academy: Race, Sex, and Citation Counts,  
29 J. LEGAL STUD. 345, 352-63 (2000) (noting that constitutional law teaching and scholarship 
is dominated by men).  
 11. Jill Elaine Hasday, Federalism and the Family Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L. REV. 
1297, 1311 (1998). This definition is not standard or controlling. It only suggests a core focus. 
As a practical matter, policies affecting the economy and income redistribution are probably 
more important t o families. Nonetheless, this article focuses on this narrower definition of 
family law.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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I. ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT FEDERALISM AND FAMILY LAW  
Judges, scholars and practitioners commonly assume that family 
law decisions are quintessentially matters of state law. For example, a 
common theme of the Supreme Court’s federalism decisions is the 
assertion that “family law (including marriage, divorce, and child 
custody)” is a matter of exclusive state concern and beyond federal 
regulation.12 Indeed, in Lopez, the 1995 watershed case limiting 
congressional power under the Commerce Clause, this assertion was 
the only proposition on which the entire Court agreed.13 Similarly, in 
United States v. Morrison, the Court struck down a provision of the 
federal Violence Against Women Act, relying in part on the need to 
distinguish “between what is truly national and what is truly local,” 
whatever the impact on interstate commerce.14 The majority 
ominously suggested that if Congress can regulate criminal behavior 
that has a serious impact on interstate commerce, the same logic 
could “be applied equally as well to family law and other areas of 
traditional state regulation since the aggregate effect of marriage, 
divorce, and child rearing on the national economy is undoubtedly 
significant.”15 
The Supreme Court’s frequent proclamation that family law is a 
matter of state, and not federal concern, originated in Barber v. 
Barber in 1859.16 Mrs. Barber obtained a divorce and alimony order 
 
 12. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995) (holding that the Gun-Free School 
Zones Act of 1990 exceeded Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause).  
 13. The majority opinion warns that “under the Government’s ‘national productivity’ 
reasoning, Congress could regulate any activity that it found related to the economic 
productivity of individual citizens: family law (including marriage, divorce, and child custody), 
for example.” Id. at 564. However, majority notes that Justice Breyer “posits that there might be 
some limitations on Congress’ commerce power, such as family law or certain aspects of 
education.” Id. at 564-65. But, the majority asserts, Justice Breyer’s “analysis would be equally 
applicable, if not more so, to subjects such as family law and direct regulation of education.” Id. 
at 565. Justice Thomas, concurring, also made the point: “[T]he power to regulate ‘commerce’ 
can by no means encompass authority over mere gun possession, any more than it empowers 
the Federal Government to regulate marriage. . . .” Id. at 585. Justice Breyer, writing for four 
dissenting Justices, asserted that to uphold the Gun-Free School Zone Act is not “to hold that 
the Commerce Clause permits the Federal Government. . . to regulate ‘marriage, divorce, and 
child custody’ . . . .” Id. at 624. 
 14. 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1754 (2000) (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. 549). 
 15. Id. at 1753. 
 16. 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1859). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol4/iss1/7
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in New York.17 Her husband then moved to Wisconsin to avoid 
enforcement.18 He filed for divorce in Wisconsin, alleging that his 
wife had abandoned him, and he concealed the New York decree.19 
Mrs. Barber filed suit in the Wisconsin federal court, invoked 
diversity jurisdiction, and asked the court to enforce her New York 
decree.20 Federal courts are generally available to adjudicate civil 
claims between parties from different states,21 but Mr. Barber 
protested that the federal court could not exercise diversity 
jurisdiction for two reasons. First, because she was a married women, 
his wife’s identify had merged into his and disappeared.22 Second, at 
English common law, divorce was an ecclesiastical action, not a civil 
action, and therefore not cognizable in federal court.23 The Supreme 
Court allowed Mrs. Barber to invoke diversity jurisdiction to enforce 
the New York award. Nonetheless, in dictum, the Court observed that 
it “disclaim[ed] altogether any jurisdiction in the courts of the United 
States” over the actual granting of divorce or alimony decrees.24 This 
dicta gave birth to the hoary “domestic relations exception” to federal 
diversity jurisdiction. 
In 1992, the Court reaffirmed much of the domestic relations 
exception to diversity jurisdiction. In Ankenbrandt v. Richards, a 
mother and citizen of Missouri filed a tort action in federal court 
against her former husband, a citizen of Louisiana, for the physical 
and mental abuse of their daughters.25 The father argued, and the 
lower courts held, that the federal courts lacked jurisdiction because 
the claim fell within the domestic relations exception to diversity 
jurisdiction.26 The Supreme Court reversed and held that while “the 
domestic relations exception, as articulated by this court since 
Barber, divests the federal courts of power to issue divorce, alimony, 
 
 17. Id. at 585.  
 18. Id. at 588.  
 19.  Id. 
 20. Id. at 584-85. 
 21. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1994). See generally ERWIN CHERMERINSKY, FEDERAL 
JURISDICTION 286-92 (3d ed. 1999). 
 22.  62 U.S. at 588-89. 
 23.  Id. at 588-92. 
 24. Id. at 584. 
 25. 504 U.S. 689 (1992). 
 26. Id. at 693-94. 
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and child custody decrees,” this tort action did not fall within the 
exception.27 The Court explored the basis for the exception and found 
that “a domestic relations exception exists as a matter of statutory 
construction not on the accuracy of the historical justifications on 
which it was seemingly based, but rather on Congress’ apparent 
acceptance of this construction of the diversity jurisdiction 
provisions. . . ” since 1859.28 
Tradition is not its own justification.29 Some scholars have argued 
that the assumption that family law is quintessentially a matter of 
state concern—exemplified by the domestic relations exception to 
federal court diversity jurisdiction—should be repudiated because the 
assumption is grounded in archaic sexist notions about women and 
marriage and perpetuates a devaluation of women, children, and 
families.30 By contrast, others assert that states are better suited than 
the federal government to develop sound principles of family law.31 
 
 27. Id. at 703. 
 28. Id. at 700. The Court also briefly invoked “policy considerations” in support of the 
domestic relations exception to federal diversity jurisdiction. “Issuance of decrees of this type 
not infrequently involves retention of jurisdiction by the court and deployment of social 
workers to monitor compliance.” Id. at 703-04. The court noted “the special proficiency 
developed by state tribunals over the past century and a half.” Id. at 704. However, of course, if 
federal courts did exercise jurisdiction over domestic relations cases in diversity situations, they 
would develop expertise in this area. 
 29. As Justice Holmes observed: 
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in 
the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid 
down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the 
past. 
Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897). For a rich 
discussion of the complexity of Holmes’ view of the role of history in the development of the 
law, see two special symposium issues on the one hundredth anniversary of the publication of 
the Path of the Law: 77 B.U. L. REV. 515 (1997); 63 BROOKLYN L. REV. 19 (1997). 
 30. Naomi R. Cahn, Family Law, Federalism, and the Federal Courts, 79 IOWA L. REV. 
1073, 1098-1101 (1994); Judith Resnik, “Naturally” Without Gender: Women, Jurisdiction, 
and the Federal Courts, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1682, 1740-50 (1991). 
 31. Anne C. Dailey, Federalism and Families, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1787, 1791-92 (1995) 
(“States . . . are far better situated than the national government to develop and sustain a 
normative political discourse on family life. Moreover, regulatory diversity among the fifty 
states preserves some measure of individual and family choice in matters touching upon the 
formative conditions of human identity.”); Ann Laquer Estin, Federalism and Child Support, 5 
VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 541, 558 (1998). Estin observed that: 
Family regulation touches directly on very sensitive matters that are deeply felt to be 
private. . . Allocating a high level of discretion to local judges, subject to oversight by 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol4/iss1/7
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Both of these views are exaggerated. While the traditional 
assumption of exclusive state control of family law was based on 
sexism, today the justifications for primary state control of family 
law are more complex. It is not that states are inherently more 
competent to devise sound family law policy. Some countries with a 
state-federal government structure define family law as a federal, 
rather than a state subject, including Canada,32 Germany,33 
Switzerland,34and Australia.35 
 
state legislatures and appellate courts, permits maximum flexibility in designing norms 
that are responsive to the thousands of disputes that are presented every day in local 
communities across the nation. 
Id. 
 32. Martha A. Field, The Differing Federalisms of Canada and the United States, 55 LAW 
& CONTEMP . PROBS. 107 (1992). Field explained: 
If anyone ever entertained the notion that there was a “normal” way for federalism to 
be structured, a comparison of the distribution of legislative power in the United States 
and Canada would dispel that notion . . . . Marriage and divorce and criminal law, for 
example, are governed by the central government in Canada but the state governments 
in the United States, while labor law, nationalized in the United States, is an area 
jealously guarded by Canada’s provincial governments.  
Id. at 108.  
 33. In Germany, as in  the United States, authority is exercised by a federal government 
(the federation or “Bund”) and by ten states or “Länder,” each of which has its own constitution 
and most of which pre-date the federal government. PHILIP M. BLAIR, FEDERALISM AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW IN WEST GERMANY 3 (1981). “Where Americans still accept considerable 
diversity as a necessary consequence of federalism, the Germans increasingly demand equality 
and uniformity in such fields as education and the social services.” Id. at 2. Like the United 
States, the federal government exercises specifically delegated power, while the Länder possess 
reserved or residual authority. Id. at 4. Unlike the United States, the federal government has 
little administrative apparatus of its own, but relies on states for the execution of federal 
authority. Id. at 5. Family law is a matter of federal legislation, modified by federal 
constitutional norms and administered by state authorities. Sibylla Fl?gge, Special Issue: 
Women’s Rights in Germany Since Unification: On the History of Fathers’ Rights and Mothers’ 
Duty of Care, 3 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 377 (1996).  
 34. Barbara Graham-Siegenthaler, Family Law in Switzerland, in FAMILY LAW IN EUROPE 
511 (Carolyn Hamilton & Kate Standley eds., 1995). 
 35. In Australia, the federal constitution gives the Commonwealth the power to regulate 
marriage and divorce. Austl. Const. § 51. “The Parliament shall . . . have power to make law . . . 
with respect to . . . Marriage . . . Divorce and matrimonial causes; and in relation thereto, 
parental rights, and the custody and guardianship of infants.” Id. Until 1959, the federal 
Parliament failed to act, recognizing that marriage and divorce are controversial; states adopted 
divergent rules. In 1959, Parliament enacted a uniform federal divorce law and, shortly 
thereafter, a uniform federal marriage law. PERCY ERNEST JOSKE, AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT 227-28 (1967). For a summary of Australian High Court decisions on family law 
see P.H. LANE, T HE AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL SYSTEM 191-215 (1979). 
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On the other hand, given our particular U.S. history, states had 
much more experience in dealing with difficult issues of family law. 
The proliferation of the states’ experience, in turn, is a consequence 
of basic assumptions of our federal system. The federal government 
is one of limited powers while states possess general authority to 
provide for the local public welfare. The basic  law of contract, tort, 
and criminal law, not merely women and families, remain primarily 
matters of state control. Family law is complex and effects, in a very 
personal and individual way, the most profound human relations. 
Further, family law disputes are abundant; family law cases constitute 
the largest category of filings at the state civil trial court level.36 
Local judges, social workers, hospitals, and law enforcement officers 
deal every day and night with families in crisis. States, therefore, 
function as “laboratories in democracy,”37 developing new 
approaches to complex issues that provide models to adopt or to 
avoid for other states and federal authorities.38 
Because of our particular history, Congress and federal judges 
lack knowledge and experience in family law issues. There is no 
 
 36. In 1991, family law cases were the largest single category of civil filings and trials at 
the trial court level at 33%, as compared with tort fillings at 10%, contract fillings at 14%, and 
real property fillings at 10%. CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADMINISTRATORS, T HE STATE 
JUSTICE INSTITUTE AND THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD 
STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT, 1991, at 15 (1993). Between 1984 and 1994, the number of new 
family law filing increased by 62%. In 1996, family law filings constituted 66% of the civil 
court docket; tort, the second most common filing constituted only 17% of the docket. 
CONFERENCE OF STATE ADMINISTRATORS, T HE STATE JUSTICE INSTITUTE AND THE NATIONAL 
CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT, 1996, at 
25, 37 (1997). Nonetheless, family law cases constitute a very small portion of the docket of 
appellate courts. See Margaret P.P. Mason, Note, Courting Reversal: The Supervisory Role of 
State Supreme Courts, 87 YALE L.J. 1191, 1210 (1978). This pattern makes it difficult to know 
the law in practice, even at the state level. Further, virtually no law school requires study of 
family law, either explicitly or implicitly.  
 37. Justice Brandeis offered the classic statement, dissenting, in New State Ice Co. v. 
Liebmann: 
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibility. Denial 
of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the Nation. It is 
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if 
its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic 
experiments without risk to the rest of the country. 
285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932). See also  BRANDEIS ON DEMOCRACY 147 (Phillippa Strum ed., 
1995); FELIX FRANKFURTER, T HE PUBLIC AND ITS GOVERNMENT 49-51 (1930). 
 38. See infra  Parts II.A and B of this Article. 
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evidence that federal decision makers have an inherent capacity to 
make better family law policy than state actors. When a uniform 
national approach makes sense, the approach may be achieved either 
through state adoption of uniform laws or through federal 
legislation.39 General federalization of this complex network of 
relations would be a radical change. Thus, this Article assumes that, 
in the United States, states are primarily responsible for family law. 
The assumption may be rooted in a sexist devaluation of women and 
families; but it is our history in the United States. 
However, states do not have exclusive authority over the 
 
 39. Enforcement of child custody judgments provides a classic example. Prior to the late 
1960s, a state could assert jurisdiction over child custody matters if it had a “substantial 
interest” in the case. See Leonard Ratner, Child Custody in a Federal System, 62 MICH. L. REV. 
795, 808 (1964). The vague standard often led to concurrent assertions of jurisdiction. Judicial 
willingness to reopen custody decisions at the behest of a state resident meant that custody 
decisions were freely modifiable in other states. Justice Jackson, dissenting in May v. Anderson, 
345 U.S. 528, 542 (1953), described the system as “a rule of seize-and-run.” 
 In 1968 the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act [hereinafter UCCJA] was drafted to 
reduce jurisdictional competition and confusion, as well as to deter parents from forum 
shopping to relitigate custody. The UCCJA applies both to initial custody decisions as well as 
modifications. D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 920-22 (1998) [hereinafter WEISBERG & APPLETON]. 
 By 1980, forty-three states had adopted the UCCJA, MARGARET STRICKLAND, HOW TO 
DEAL WITH A PARENTAL KIDNAPPING 92 (1983), and now all fifty have done so. Robert G. 
Spectpor, Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (With Prefatory Note and 
Comments by Robert G. Spector), 32 FAM. L.Q. 301, 305-06 (1997). But, some states modified 
the uniform standards, and in other states, courts interpreted the provisions inconsistently. Id. 
Congress enacted the Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act [hereinafter PKPA], 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1738A (1994), to provide greater uniformity in determinations of jurisdiction over child 
custody disputes than had been achieved under the UCCJA. The UCCJA and the PKPA are 
generally similar, though in modification claims, the federal law gives greater weight to the 
“exclusive continuing jurisdiction” in the initial decree-granting state. WEISBERG & APPLETON, 
supra  at 923-24.  
 Because the federal law is also subject to interpretation in individual cases, it is not clear 
that it achieved its objective of uniformity. Anne B. Goldstein declares both the UCCJA and the 
PKPA “spectacularly unsuccessful,” but concedes that the failure may be in implementation, 
rather than drafting. Anne B. Goldstein, The Tragedy of the Interstate Child: A Critical 
Reexamination of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and the Parental Kidnapping 
Prevention Act, 25 U.C. DAVIS 845, 880 (1992). Commentators and courts disagree about 
whether the PKPA preempts the UCCJA. Compare Russell M. Coombs, Interstate Child 
Custody: Jurisdiction, Recognition, and Enforcement, 66 MINN. L. REV. 711, 765 (1982) 
(arguing no preemption because PKPA does not confer jurisdiction, but rather specifies duties 
of recognition and nonmodification for decrees consistent with its jurisdictional requirements), 
with Henry H. Foster, Child Custody Jurisdiction: UCCJA and PKPA, 27 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 
297, 299 (1981) (arguing that the federal statute supercedes state provisions when conflict 
arises).  
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regulation of family law. The federal government has long sought to 
promote particular family values. For example, a central concern of 
the abolitionist movement, the Civil War, and the Civil Rights 
Amendments was to secure access to legitimate family relations for 
former slaves.40 In the nineteenth century the federal government 
made repudiation of polygamy a condition of statehood41 and a 
federal crime.42 And throughout the twentieth century, the Supreme 
Court interpreted the Constitution to limit state authority to regulate 
families.43 
In summary, the big picture is: states have primary responsibility 
for the regulation of families, yet the federal government has 
considerable authority to intervene and often has done so. Many 
observers have addressed the large question of when federal 
intervention is justified in relation to particular subjects in the 
literature of law44 and political science.45 There is general agreement 
 
 40. Hasday, supra note 11, at 1319-58. Peggy Cooper Davis, Symposium: Changing 
Images of the State: Contested Images of Family Values: The Role of the State, 107 HARV. L. 
REV. 1348, 1361-73 (1994). 
 41. Hasday, supra  note 11, at 1319-58. 
 42. 12 Stat. 501, ch. 126 (1862). 
 43. See infra Appendix 2. 
 44. Some legal scholars focus specifically on the role of the federal courts. For example 
Richard H. Posner argues that the federal courts, and presumably the federal government, have 
special responsibility in situations in which states can adopt policies that impose costs on other 
states (interstate externalities), or when “federal rights . . . are likely to be asserted by people 
who are politically disfavored . . . because they lack effective political power in the state.” 
RICHARD A. POSNER, T HE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 165 (interstate costs), 180 
(powerless minorities) (1985). Erwin Chemerinsky and Larry Kramer offer a different 
approach, identifying “six major functions” of the federal courts: enforcement of the U.S. 
Constitution, “protecting the interests of the federal government as a sovereign,” umpiring 
“interstate disputes,” “assuring uniform interpretation and application of federal law,” 
“developing federal common law,” and overseeing federal administrative adjudication. Erwin 
Chermerinsky & Larry Kramer, Defining the Role of the Federal Courts, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 
67, 77-87 (1990). 
 Other legal scholars address allocation of power between state and federal authority in 
relation to particular issues, such as the environment. For example, Richard Stewart argues that 
four characteristics of state authority, as opposed to federal authority, may promote individual 
liberty: (1) Local authorities may make more accurate assessments of costs and benefits; (2) 
they may be more likely to protect individual liberty by making it more difficult for any one 
group to seize national power; (3) they may foster community through opportunities for 
political participation; and (4) they may promote diversity through decentralization. Richard B. 
Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of 
National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1210-11 (1977). Stewart also supports 
federal regulation of the environment:  
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that the federal government has a special role in mediating interstate 
disputes, assuring national uniformity where important, redistributing 
wealth, and protecting essential rights of vulnerable minorities, 
whoever they may be and whatever rights are considered essential.46 
These principles, while important, are obviously quite vague. 
Family law is not inherently state or federal. The key question is: 
When is federal intervention in family law wise? The substantive 
judgment of what helps and hurts families is highly contested and 
political. This discussion begins with the examination of a few cases 
in which most informed observers agree that federal intervention has 
been good for families and then turns to consider some cases where 
federal intervention was not helpful to families. The categorization of 
federal interventions that help or hurt is necessarily complex. For 
example, child support standards and enforcement guidelines are on 
balance a sound federal intervention, though they could be improved 
in significant ways.47 By contrast, while federal support for student 
loans for higher education or pensions for federal employees is just 
and sensible, federal policy sometimes senselessly ignores state 
family law.48 From this background of particular cases we are able to 
derive general answers to the question of when the federal 
 
Given the mobility of industry and commerce, any individual state or community may 
rationally decline unilaterally to adopt high environmental standards that entail 
substantial costs for industry and obstacles to economic development for fear that the 
resulting environmental gains will be more than offset by movement of capital to other 
areas with lower standards.  
Id. at 1212. 
 45. Much of the political science literature examines specific programs and policies and 
assesses diverse allocations of authority and responsibility between state and federal 
governments. See generally the journal PUBLIUS, providing detailed analysis of cross-cultural 
comparisons, education, environmental policy, governance, health care financing and delivery, 
taxation, transportation, voting, welfare and other subjects. This literature, while fascinating, 
offers sparse insight on family law and little in the way of large, general principles. Other 
political scientists seek to articulate general principles for allocating authority between state and 
federal governments. See, e.g., PAUL E. PETERSON ET AL., WHEN FEDERALISM WORKS 10-20 
(1986) (arguing that local governments have great capacity for developmental policy, including 
the maintenance of community infrastructure, while central governments have greater capacity 
for redistribution policies).  
 46. Supra  notes 37-38. 
 47. See infra  Parts II.A and II.B.  
 48. See infra  Part III.A. 
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government should intervene in state family law.49 
The allocation of responsibility and authority between state and 
federal governments is complicated. Traditional left or right, liberal 
or conservative, and states rights or federal control predispositions do 
not provide easy guidance. Given the narrow definition of family law, 
the principles of public policy remain, at best, only suggestive.  
II. FEDERAL INTERVENTIONS THAT SEEM TO HELP FAMILIES 
There are many cases in which most informed people believe that 
federal intervention in family law has been beneficial. 
A. Child Support Standards 
Federal action to define and enforce child support standards is a 
primary but complex example of a case where federal intervention 
has been helpful. There is broad public support for the notion that 
parents should support their children.50 The definition and 
 
 49. A skeptical reader could plausibly claim that my methodology is “wholly subjective,” 
i.e., that I like federal power when it reaches results that I like and reject it when it doesn’t. I do 
not have a slam-dunk answer to that doubt. Still, drawing generalizations from concrete cases 
has an honorable pedigree. The essence of the common law is to address concrete cases, see 
what works, and develop generalities slowly. See OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 
35-38 (1881); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE : REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 70-
71 (1962). Medicine also seeks to draw general principles for concrete experience. See, e.g., 
Sarah Marie Lambert & Howard Markel, Making History: Thomas Francis, Jr., MD, and the 
1954 Salk Poliomyelitis Vaccine Field Trial, 154 ARCH. PEDIATR. ADOLESC. MED. 512, 512-13 
(2000).  
 My methodology is different from the common law in that I have picked my cases, rather 
than waiting for litigants with standing to walk through the door. Also, I seek to draw larger 
generalizations than are typically offered in deciding a common law case. Finally, I do not 
canvass the entire universe of federal intervention in family law. For example, I do not explore 
the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, PUB. L. NO. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 
(codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. §§ 620 et. seq. (1988)) or the Adoption and Safe Families 
Act of 1997, 42 U.S.C. § 675(5) (1988). These federal laws are complex and controversial. See, 
e.g., ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, NOBODY’S CHILDREN: ABUSE AND NEGLECT, FOSTER DRIFT, 
AND THE ADOPTION ALTERNATIVE (1999) (arguing for more efficient means to place abused 
and neglected children in adoptive homes); Martin Guggenheim, Somebody’s Children: 
Sustaining the Family’s Place in Child Welfare Policy, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1716 (2000) (book 
review) (arguing for more effective support for biological families).  
 50. “What is particularly striking about the many child support provisions that Congress 
has adopted over time is how popular they have been with both political parties.” David L. 
Chambers, Fathers, the Welfare System, and the Virtues and Perils of Child-Support 
Enforcement, 81 VA. L. REV. 2575, 2586 (1995) [hereinafter Chambers, 1995].  
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enforcement of child support is vitally important to millions of 
children. In spring 1996, 22.8 million children under twenty-one 
years of age lived with one parent while their other parent lived 
elsewhere. These children comprised about 28% of all children under 
twenty-one years of age living in families.51 About 11.6 million, or 
85%, of the 13.7 million custodial parents were women.52 Thirty 
percent of these custodial parents had family incomes below the 
poverty threshold, compared with 16% of all parents with children 
under age twenty-one.53 
For most of our history, states defined the standards for 
determining parents’ financial obligations to children and generally 
left the determinations to trial court judges.54 State judges 
systematically underestimated the costs of raising children; 
overestimated the ability of custodial parents, usually mothers, to 
maximize income while providing child care; and bent over 
backwards to accommodate the family and career needs of non-
 
 Ironically, Chambers, one of the most prolific proponents of more effective child support 
enforcement in the United States, suggested in 1982 that we should abandon the expectation 
that parents should support their children. David L. Chambers,  The Coming Curtailment of 
Compulsory Child Support, 80 MICH . L. REV. 1614 (1982). Chambers observed that many 
children are entitled to support from a parent who no longer lives with them, or never did. Id. 
While there is widespread lip service to the notion that parents should support their children, the 
practice is different. Id. Chambers cited several related developments to both predict and 
support abandonment of the notion that biological parents should provide financial support for 
their children. Id. at 1624-25. If abortion is a safe and morally neutral option for women, then 
the mere fact that a man “causes” a child in some biological way should not be any more 
relevant than the fact that donating sperm at a sperm bank may “cause” a child. Id. at 1618-20. 
Families are increasingly transient and the law should recognize that people increasingly define 
a family as those people with whom one lives at any particular moment in time. Id. at 1621-26. 
Over time, non-custodial parents become detached from children, and fathers come to regard 
child support as taxation without representation. Id. at 1622. More women are working and able 
to support a family. Id. at 1625. Compulsory support involves government in people’s lives in 
intrusive ways for many many years. “Government should not be in the business of enforcing 
nostalgia for a world that no longer exists.” Id. at 1634. Few agree with the Chambers proposal. 
Indeed, Chambers subsequent work suggests that the 1982 proposal was intended as 
provocative. Chambers, 1995, supra , at 2582-87. 
 51. Lydia Scroon-Rogers, Child Support for Custodial Mothers and Fathers: 1995, 60 
CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS 195 (1999) (based on 1995 census data) [hereinafter, 1995 
census data]. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra  note 39, at 734-35. FRANK F. FURSTENBERG, JR. & 
ANDREW J. CHERLIN, DIVIDED FAMILIES: WHAT HAPPENS TO CHILDREN WHEN PARENTS 
PART, 49-52 (1991) [hereinafter FURSTENBERG & CHERLIN]. 
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custodial parents.55 State trial court discretion, combined with the 
absence of any clear theory or objective for child support awards, 
resulted in child support orders that were pathetically low by any 
standard.56 
Through the 1970s, sociologists and other scholars assailed the 
chronic problem of grossly low child support awards, and many 
proposed alternatives to assure more adequate and predictable levels 
of support.57 A few states grappled with the problem and came up 
with formulae that limited trial court discretion and set guidelines for 
what parents owe their children.58 However, most states were 
paralyzed. Family law issues were never high on state legislatures’ 
agendas,59 and trial court judges wanted to retain their discretion.60 
 
 55. ANDREA H. BELLER & JOHN W. GRAHAM, SMALL CHANGE: THE ECONOMICS OF 
CHILD SUPPORT 165 (1993) [hereinafter BELLER & GRAHAM]; FURSTENBERG & CHERLIN, 
supra  note 54, at 49-56. 
 56. BELLER & GRAHAM, supra  note 55, at 37. FURSTENBERG & CHERLIN, supra note 54, 
at 60-61. 
 57. BELLER & GRAHAM, supra  note 55, at 5. FURSTENBERG & CHERLIN, supra note 54, at 
50-52. Irwin Garfinkel developed a standard, first adopted in Wisconsin and then in other states, 
requiring non-custodial parents to pay a fixed percentage of income that varied with the number 
of children supported. Irwin Garfinkel, The Role of Child Support Insurance in Anti-poverty 
Policy, 479 ANNALS, AAPS 119 (1985); Irwin Garfinkel, A New Approach to Child Support, 75 
PUBLIC INTEREST 111 (1984). Judge Elwood F. Melson of the Delaware Family Court 
developed a more complicated version of the income shares formula that reflects several public 
policy concerns. Particularly, the formula recognizes the public policy that parents’ own 
economic status should not be allowed to grow until the parents jointly, in proportion to their 
incomes, meet the basic poverty level needs of their children and incorporates a Standard of 
Living Adjustment (SOLA) into child support awards. Laura W. Morgan, Child Support And 
the Anomalous Cases of the High-Income and Low-Income Parent: The Need to Reconsider 
What Constitutes “Support” in the American and Canadian Child Support Guideline Models, 
13 CAN. J. FAM. L. 161, 180 (1996). Isabel V. Sawhill has argued that child support awards 
would be more equitable if they were calculated in a manner that attempts to equalize the 
standard of living of the custodial and the non-custodial parent after divorce while the child is a 
minor. Isabel V. Sawhill, Developing Normative Standards for Child Support Payments, in THE 
PARENTAL CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION (Judith Cassetty ed., 1983). See also Marcia Garrison, 
Automony or Community? An Evaluation of Two Models of Parental Obligation, 86 CALIF. L. 
REV. 41, 59 (1998) [hereinafter Garrison, 1998].  
 58. BELLER & GRAHAM, supra  note 55, at 165. DAVID CHAMBERS, MAKING FATHERS 
PAY: THE ENFORCEMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT (1979) [hereinafter, CHAMBERS]. 
 59. Sylvia A. Law & Patricia Hennessey, Is the Law Male?: The Case of Family Law, 69 
CHI. KENT L. REV. 345 (1993) (noting that state legislatures have not addressed issues of child 
custody standards).  
 60. Jane C. Murphy, Eroding the Myth of Discretionary Justice in Family Law: The Child 
Support Experiment, 70 N.C. L. REV. 209 (1991). See, e.g., Schmidt v. Schmidt, 444 N.W.2d 
267, 277 (S.D. 1989) (declining to apply statutory guidelines, the dissenting judge observed 
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In the 1980s, Congress required that states adopt child support 
guidelines that would control unless a judge provided reasons for 
departures.61 Congress gave states three years to adopt such 
guidelines and allowed states discretion in choosing standards to 
meet defined federal norms.62 States adopted various approaches, 
building on the experience of pioneering states and early scholarly 
evaluations.63 Empirical studies show that the guidelines had positive, 
though modest, effects in achieving the congressional objectives of 
increased award levels, consistency, and case processing efficiency.64 
The guidelines adopted pursuant to the federal mandate are far 
from perfect. In most states, once orders are set, they are seldom 
modified and so as time passes, support represents a smaller 
proportion of fathers’ earnings and childrens’ needs.65 Of the nearly 
ten million mothers raising children with absent fathers who are 
alive, only slightly more than half have an order for support.66 Poor 
children who receive federally supported aid receive only the first 
fifty dollars in child support, while the rest goes to repay the state for 
aid provided.67 This regime undermines the mother’s incentives to aid 
in the enforcement of child support and the father’s incentives to pay. 
 
that, “we, in the judiciary, retain our independence; we also vault a known, Equity, forged 
through the centuries in jurisprudence, over an unknown substitute of legislative dogmatism 
. . .”). 
 61. For a good history of this legislation, see Chambers, supra  note 50. 
 62. In 1984 Congress mandated that, by 1987, states use child support guidelines as 
rebuttable presumptions in cases in which the state seeks to recover payments made to support a 
poor child from an absent parent. In 1988, the guideline requirement was extended to all cases. 
Family Support Act of 1988 (FSA), 42 U.S.C. § 667(a)-(b) (1994). 
 63. The most popular form of guideline, adopted in thirty-two states, computes the total 
parental income and allocates support obligations based on a formula. Another sixteen states 
require the non-custodial parent to pay a specified percentage of income, adjusted by the 
number of children. A few states follow a more complex formula, initially developed in 
Delaware, which prorates child support needs based on parental income. BELLER & GRAHAM, 
supra  note 55, at 199-201.  
 64. Nancy Thoennes et al., The Impact of Child Support Guidelines on Award Adequacy, 
Award Variability, and Case Processing Efficiency, 25 FAM. L.Q. 325, 345 (1991). But see 
Garrison, 1998, supra  note 57, at 62-63 (offering a pessimistic assessment of the impact of 
guidelines on increasing child support levels).  
 65. Robert G. Williams, Implementation of the Child Support Provisions of the Family 
Support Act: Child Support Guidelines, Updating of Awards, and Routine Income Withholding, 
in CHILD SUPPORT AND CHILD WELL BEING 93, 95 (Irwin Garfinkel et al. eds., 1994). 
 66. Chambers, 1995, supra  note 50, at 2598. 
 67. 42 U.S.C. § 657(b) (1994); 45 C.F.R. § 302.51 (2000). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p175 Law.doc  3/22/01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
190 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 4:175 
 
 
Further, the fifty dollar disregard was never changed. Beller and 
Graham argue that the child support disregard should be increased to 
one-half of the poverty level.68 
B. Child Support Enforcement 
Federal intervention requiring states to create more effective 
remedies to enforce child support obligations is another example of 
policy that seems helpful. Under traditional state rules, the custodial 
parent had sole responsibility for enforcing child support orders. 
Non-custodial parents frequently failed to pay child support and 
custodial parents often lacked the legal and financial resources 
needed to collect support.69 Even when custodial parents pursued 
legal claims, state judges were often unsympathetic to their claims for 
delinquent child support. Moreover, the judges often lacked effective 
means to assure that children received the support to which they were 
entitled. Many scholars documented these problems and proposed 
new approaches.70 Several states created mechanisms for child 
support enforcement that were demonstrably more effective than 
those of their sister states.71 But most states did little to assure that 
 
 68. BELLER & GRAHAM, supra  note 55, at 254. 
 69. Nan D. Hunter offers this description of the situation in the 1970s:  
When the typical father is ordered to pay child support, he is usually told to send the 
mother a check every pay period. Keeping track of the payments or lack of them is up 
to her. Most courts have a system for keeping the record on computer but judges 
frequently do not order that this be done, especially for middle- and upper-middle-
class fathers,  for whom it is considered embarrassing. Even when the bookkeeping is 
maintained on a computer, if the father does not pay, often nothing happens. It is up to 
the mother to institute enforcement proceedings. Many months will pass before the 
amount owed to her equals or exceeds the retainer she will have to pay a lawyer to 
bring suit. By the time it becomes worth it to sue, her financial plans and budgeting 
may be in turmoil. If the amount due builds up and the case does get to court, judges in 
some states are permitted to decrease the amount of arrearage retroactively if they 
believe it is too large for the father to afford (the children, after all, have managed to 
survive). 
Nan D. Hunter, Women and Child Support, in FAMILIES, POLITICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (Irene 
Diamond ed., 1983); FURSTENBERG & CHERLIN, supra  note 54, at 59. 
 70. FURSTENBERG & CHERLIN, supra  note 54, at 50-52; IRWIN GARFINKEL, ASSURING 
CHILD SUPPORT 29-31, 74-76 (1992); Stephen D. Sugarman, Financial Support of Children and 
the End of Welfare as We Know It, 81 VA. L. REV. 2523, 2534-35, 2573 (1995). 
 71. See, e.g., CHAMBERS, supra  note 58, at 84 (describing Michigan’s organized program 
to enforce child support obligations through jailing); Pamela Forrestal Roper, Hitting Deadbeat 
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children received the child support to which they were entitled. 
However, in 1988 Congress required that states adopt laws to: allow 
child support to be withheld from income, provide for expedited 
enforcement procedures, allow diversion of state income tax refunds, 
and permit liens against real and personal property for overdue 
support.72 In addition, in 1994 Congress made it a federal crime to 
willfully fail to pay state ordered child support if the amount exceeds 
$5000, or has remained unpaid for over one year, and the child and 
parent live in different states.73 These new federally mandated 
remedies provided real help to thousands of children. For example, 
wage withholding, which was extremely rare prior to the adoption of 
the 1988 federal act, produced more than 55% of all child support 
payments in 1994, over five billion dollars.74 In fiscal year 1997, a 
 
Parents Where it Hurts: “Punitive” Mechanisms in Child Support Enforcement, 14 ALASKA L. 
REV. 41, 42 (1997) (discussing Alaska’s success with the recent expansion of criminal 
sanctions for those who aid and abet nonpayment of child support obligations and the 
suspension, revocation, or denial of driver’s and occupational licenses of delinquent obligors); 
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, 
LICENSE RESTRICTION AND REVOCATION: A PARTIAL PROGRESS REPORT (1996) (calling 
Maine’s occupational and driver’s license revocation program one of the “best practices” for 
obtaining payment from delinquent obligors); Charles David Creech, Survey of Developments 
in North Carolina Law, 1986: VII. Domestic Law: Legislating Responsibility: North Carolina’s 
New Child Support Enforcement Acts, 65 N.C.L. REV. 1354, 1357 (1987) (noting that the 
dramatic results of North Carolina’s program can be attributed, at least in part, to an increased 
number of cases in which paternity has been established); Margaret Campbell Haynes & Peter 
S. Feliceangeli, Child Support in the Year 2000, 3 DEL. L. REV. 65, 66 (2000) (describing the 
“arsenal” of enforcement tools Delaware has adopted to ensure child support enforcement, 
especially the unprecedented administrative power the Delaware’s Division of Child Support 
Enforcement, which includes access to virtually every government data base for the purpose of 
locating absent parents, establishing paternity of children, and enforcing child support against 
obligated parents). 
 72. The Family Support Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-69 (1994). For a good description 
of subsequent amendments see Paula Roberts, The Family Law Implications of the 1996 
Welfare Legislation, CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 988 (Jan.-Feb. 1997). 
 73. The Child Support Recovery Act, 18 U.S.C. § 228 (1994). Several defendants 
challenged the criminal penalty as beyond the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause. 
Federal courts rejected these claims reasoning that payment of a debt constitutes economic 
activity and the difference in location of obligor and obligee requires satisfaction of the debt by 
interstate means. See WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra  note 39, at 783-84. In 2000 the Sixth 
Circuit held that the Act exceeds the power of Congress. United States v. Faassee, 227 F.3d 660 
(6th Cir., 2000), rehearing en banc granted, 2000 U.S. App. Lexis 31238 (6th Cir. Dec. 1, 
2000). 
 74. Paul Legler, The Coming Revolution in Child Support Policy: Implications of the 1996 
Welfare Act, 30 FAM. L.Q. 519, 539 (1996) [hereinafter Legler]. 
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record $13.4 billion was collected on behalf of children, an increase 
of 70% since fiscal year 1992.75 In addition, more than one million 
paternities were established, an increase of over 100% since fiscal 
year 1992. This increase is largely attributable to paternities 
established through the voluntary in-hospital paternity programs.76 
State experience showed that leaving enforcement responsibility 
to individual custodial parents is not effective and that a well 
organized program was needed to send non-custodial parents the 
message that payment of child support is mandatory.77 Congress 
required that states create organized programs for child support 
enforcement.78 At the rhetorical level, Congress is committed to 
universal enforcement: “The vision for child support enforcement 
that guided much of the development of the legislation is that the 
payment of child support should be automatic and inescapable—‘like 
death or taxes.’”79 In response to federal prodding, some states 
created effective coordinated programs to ensure child support 
payments.80 
Disappointingly, federal studies and private law suits reveal that 
other states failed to organize effective child support enforcement 
systems. For example, after extensive trial, the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals described Arizona’s programs as one of: 
systematic failures, including the failure to procure wage 
assignment when all information as to the former spouse’s 
current employer and address has been provided by the 
custodial parent, the failure to disburse collected support 
payments in a timely manner or to sufficiently account for 
payments collected, the frequent losses of clients’ files thus 
forcing them repeatedly to re-initiate enforcement procedures 
 
 75. OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 
SERVICES, T WENTY -SECOND ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS (1999) [hereinafter 1999 REPORT 
TO CONGRESS ON CHILD SUPPORT]. 
 76. Id. 
 77. CHAMBERS, supra  note 58, at 90; GARFINKEL, supra  note 70, at 29-31. 
 78. “A State plan for child and spousal support must  . . . (3) provide for the establishment 
or designation of a single and separate organizational unit, which meets such staffing and 
organizational requirements as the Secretary may by regulation prescribe, within the State to 
administer the plan . . ..” 42 U.S.C. § 654 (1994). 
 79. Legler, supra note 74, at 538. 
 80. Id. at 522.  
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and to complete voluminous forms and burdensome paperwork 
over and over again, and the inexplicable failure to account for 
or disburse “pass-through” payments.81 
In other contexts, Congress recognized that broad federal 
mandates will be followed only if there are effective legal remedies 
to enforce them82 and provisions to pay attorneys who succeed in 
proving a violation of federal law.83 But more often, Congress does 
not specifically address the question whether beneficiaries can 
enforce rules requiring states to implement programs that meet 
federal standards. When Congress does not explicitly authorize a 
private federal action allowing beneficiaries to enforce program 
requirements, the Supreme Court has long been divided on whether 
courts should be available to assure that federal program 
requirements are followed. For example, in 1990 the Court in Wilder 
v. Virginia Hospital Association held that hospitals may sue states 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enforce a Medicaid provision requiring 
that states pay hospitals “reasonable and adequate” rates for services 
provided to beneficiaries.84 The Wilder Court asked whether “the 
provision in question was intended to benefit the putative plaintiff.”85 
If so, the provision creates an enforceable right unless it reflects 
merely a “congressional preference” for a certain kind of conduct 
rather than a binding obligation on the state, or unless the interest 
asserted by the plaintiff is “too vague and amorphous” and thus 
 
 81. Freestone v. Cowan, 68 F.3d 1141, 1145 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 82. For example, when Congress required that hospitals provide emergency medical care 
to all who seek it, Congress specifically created a federal cause of action if services are 
wrongfully denied, as well as federal administrative remedies. See Roberts v. Galen of Virginia, 
119 S. Ct. 685 (1999). See also  Murray S. Levin, The Role of Substantive Law in Business 
Arbitration and the Importance of Volition, 35 AM. BUS. L.J.  105, 165-66 (1997) (discussing 
criticism of mandatory arbitration clauses as a condition to employment and acknowledging the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s and Congress’ preference for preservation of 
the individual right to sue); Rand E. Rosenblatt, The Courts, Health Care Reform, and the 
Reconstruction of American Social Legislation, 18 J. OF HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 439, 457, 
460, 467-68 (1993) (arguing that judicially enforceable rights are vital in federal-state health 
financing programs). 
 83. See generally Survey: 1993-94 Annual Survey of Labor and Employment Law: 
Employment Discrimination Law, 36 B.C. L. REV. 373 (1995) (on the importance of attorney’s 
fees). 
 84. 496 U.S. 498 (1990). 
 85. Id. at 509. 
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“beyond the competence of the judiciary to enforce.”86 In 1970, 
Justice John Marshall Harlan explained why beneficiaries should be 
able to enlist the federal courts to help explicate and enforce the 
complex requirements that federal statutes impose on states. 
Congress often voices “its wishes in muted strains” and leaves “it to 
the courts to discern the theme in the cacophony of political 
understanding.”87 Even when the federal agency is given specific 
authority to enforce federal requirements on the states, Justice Harlan 
explained that “We are most reluctant to assume Congress has closed 
the avenue of effective judicial review to those individuals most 
directly affected by the administration of its program.”88 Courts, he 
noted, should avoid reading federal statutes in ways that make them 
“a futile, hollow, and, indeed, a deceptive gesture.”89 
On the other hand, some Justices have long envisioned a more 
limited role for the federal courts in enforcing federal requirements in 
cooperative state-federal programs. In 1991, in Suter v. Artist M., the 
Justices who dissented in Wilder prevailed and ruled that 
beneficiaries could not enlist the help of the federal courts to enforce 
provisions of a federal law requiring states to make “reasonable 
efforts” to reunite biological families prior to placing children for 
adoption.90 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, articulated 
a radically different view of the role of the federal courts in enforcing 
the federal conditions upon state-federal programs. He acknowledged 
that “the Act does place a requirement on the States,” but held “that 
requirement only goes so far as to ensure that the State have a plan 
approved by the Secretary which contains the [elements required by 
the statute].”91 The Suter court also noted that the statute did not 
define the core term, “reasonable efforts,” with precision. “How the 
State was to comply with this directive, and with the other provisions 
 
 86. Id. at 507. 
 87. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 412 (1970). 
 88. Id. at 420. 
 89. Id. at 415. See also  Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980); Wright v. City of Roanoke 
Redevelopment & Housing Auth., 497 U.S. 418 (1987). 
 90. 503 U.S. 347 (1992). Between Wilder in 1990 and Suter in 1992, Justices Brennan and 
Marshall, who were in the majority in Wilder, retired and were replaced by Justices Souter and 
Thomas, respectively.  
 91. 503 U.S. at 358. 
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of the Act, was, within broad limits, left up to the State.”92 While 
Suter distinguishes, rather than overrules Wilder, the two cases 
represent fundamentally different views on the appropriate role of the 
federal courts in enforcing federal requirements in state-federal 
programs.93 
In Blessing v. Freestone, the Supreme Court addressed this 
conflict in determining whether custodial parents and children could 
challenge the systemic failures in Arizona’s child support 
enforcement program.94 The Court held that a class of beneficiaries 
who were denied services to which they were entitled under federal 
law could not challenge the systemic failure of the program.95 
Because federal law only required “substantial compliance,” only the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services could determine non-
compliance and seek administrative remedies.96 Nonetheless, the 
Court left open the possibility that individual plaintiffs could 
reformulate their complaints to articulate more precise and narrowly 
defined claims: “Only when the complaint is broken down into 
manageable analytic bites can a court ascertain . . . whether a federal 
statute creates rights.”97 
Sadly, while some state child support enforcement programs made 
substantial improvements under the federal mandate, most children 
entitled to child support still do not receive it.98 “After twenty years 
of effort, more fathers pay more money than ever before, but over 
half of all children with an absent parent still receive no support.”99 
 
 92. Id. at 360. 
 93. See also  Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 19 (1981) (holding 
that a federal “patients’ bill of rights” merely expresses a “congressional preference” for a 
certain kind of conduct rather than a binding obligation on the state). 
 94. 520 U.S. 329, 342 (1997).  
 95. Id. at 342-47. 
 96. Id. at 341. 
 97. Id. at 342.  
 98. In cases involving low income families, paying cases in 1997 accounted for only 22% 
of the Child Support Enforcement caseload. 1999 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CHILD SUPPORT, 
supra  note 75, at 166. Some states do considerably better. For example, Vermont has a 44% 
collection rate, Minnesota 43%, and Washington State 38%. Paula Roberts, Beyond Welfare: 
The Case for Child Support Assurance, 8 & n.5 (Center for Law and Social Policy, Kellogg 
Devolution Initiative Paper, 1999).  
 99. Chambers 1995, supra  note 50, at 2588. 
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C. Employment and Family Responsibilities 
Between 1959 and 1974, the employment rate for mothers with 
children under the age of three more than doubled, from 15% to 31%. 
By 1987, 56% of the mothers of children under the age of six were in 
the labor force.100 Beginning in the 1970s, this sea of change in 
employment patterns of mothers of young children produced public 
calls for policies that allow workers time to care for family members 
without losing their jobs. Many states acted to provide workers the 
right to take an unpaid leave to care for newborns or family members 
who were ill.101 Federal legislation, the Family Medical Leave Act 
(FMLA), was first proposed in 1985,102 twice passed by the Congress 
and vetoed by President Bush, and finally signed in to law by 
President Clinton in 1993.103 
The core purpose of the FMLA is “to entitle employees to take 
reasonable leave for medical reasons, for the birth or adoption of a 
child, and for the care of a child, spouse, or parent who has a serious 
health condition.”104 Employees are entitled to a total of twelve 
workweeks of unpaid leave during any twelve-month period.105 
Leave protected by the FMLA is limited to care for immediate family 
members: children, parents or spouses.106 Apart from the care of 
infants and newly adopted children, leave is only available to care for 
 
 100. Marie Richmond-Abbott, Women Wage Earners, in FEMINIST PHILOSOPHIES 135, 136 
(Janet A. Kourany et al. eds., 1992). In 1999, six out of every ten mothers of children under age 
three were in the labor force (i.e., working or looking for work). U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, 
REPORT ON THE AMERICAN WORKFORCE  1999, at http://www.bls.gov/opub/rtawhome.htm (last 
visited Dec. 22, 2000). Seven out of every ten mothers of children age three to five were in the 
labor force. Id. Between 1990 and 1999, the labor force participation rate of mothers with 
children under age three increased from 53.6% to 60.7%. Id. 
 101. Nancy R. Daspit, The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993: A Great Idea But a 
“Rube Goldberg” Solution?, 43 EMORY L.J. 1351, 1405 (1994). 
 102. Patricia Schroeder, Parental Leave: The Need for a Federal Policy, in THE PARENTAL 
LEAVE CRISIS: TOWARD A NATIONAL POLICY  326-332 (Edward F. Zigler & Meryl Frank eds., 
1988). 
 103.  PUB. L. NO. 103-3, 107 Stat. 7 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-54 
(1994)). 
 104. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(2) (1994). 
 105. § 2612(a)(1). 
 106. Id. Gay and lesbian partners are thus not entitled to leave to care for one another or 
children that they co-parent. See Ruth Colker, The Anti-Subordination Principle: Applications, 
3 WISC. WOMEN’S L.J. 59, 74-75 (1987). 
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family members who are seriously ill.107 In 2000, two circuit courts 
of appeals, applying the Supreme Court’s new concepts limiting 
federal power, held that the FMLA is unconstitutional as applied to 
state employers.108 
The FMLA has been criticized from two directions. Business 
opponents of the FMLA argued that it would have a significant 
negative impact on industry. However, an empirical study 
commissioned by Congress (based on seven million work sites) 
reveals that the FMLA has had little impact in terms of cost or 
disruption to employers.109 On the other hand, many feminists 
criticized the FMLA as not doing enough to enable workers to meet 
their family obligations. The FMLA provides no protection to part-
time workers, even though the economy increasingly relies on part-
time workers and parents of young children, particularly women, are 
disproportionately likely to work part-time.110 Most seriously, the 
FMLA only protects the worker’s ability to take unpaid leave and 
therefore forces workers to choose between caring for family and 
earning a salary.111 
In 1999, advocates for family leave benefits developed a new 
 
 107. FMLA defines “serious health condition” as “an illness, injury, impairment, or 
physical or mental condition that involves—(A) inpatient care in a hospital, hospice, or 
residential medical care facility; or (B) continuing treatment by a health care provider.” 29 
U.S.C. § 2611(11). The Department of Labor promulgated regulations that define a “serious 
health condition” as one in which an employee is (1) incapacitated for more than three days, (2) 
seen once by a doctor, and (3) prescribed a course of medication. 29 C.F.R. § 825.114 (2000). 
See Brannon v. Oshkosh B’Gosh, Inc., 897 F. Supp. 1028 (D. Tenn. 1995) (showing that 
plaintiff, who was terminated for excessive absenteeism, succeeded in demonstrating that her 
daughter had a “serious health condition” that excused an absence from work, but failed in 
demonstrating that her own previous illness was sufficiently severe to justify absence). 
 108. Sims v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 219 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. 2000); Hale v. Mann, 219 F.3d 61 
(2nd Cir. 2000). See Appendix 1. 
 109. U.S. COMM. ON LEAVE , A WORKABLE BALANCE : REPORT TO CONGRESS ON FAMILY 
AND MEDICAL LEAVE POLICIES 144-46 (May 1996). 
 110. JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND 
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 112 (2000) [hereinafter WILLIAMS]; Ann Brookman, Flexibility at 
What Price? The Costs of Part-Time Work for Women Workers,  52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 799, 
804 (1995). 
 111. Christine Littleton, for example, is highly critical of the FMLA for not assuring paid 
leave. Christine A. Littleton, Does it Still Make Sense to Talk about “Women”?, 1 UCLA 
WOMEN’S L.J. 15, 36-37 (1991). But, as Williams points out, the political st ruggle to obtain 
unpaid leave was long and difficult and the realistic choice was protection for unpaid leave or 
nothing at all. WILLIAMS, supra  note 110, at 228-29. 
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approach to the problem. Since the depression, the U.S. 
unemployment compensation system has been administered by the 
states, within federal guidelines and with federal financial support.112 
Because the economy is robust and unemployment is at historic low 
levels, many state unemployment compensation funds are flush.113 As 
a result, the Department of Labor issued regulations allowing and 
encouraging states to allow new parents to apply for unemployment 
compensation to enable them to take leave to care for new children.114 
The new program allowing states to use unemployment 
compensation funds to make paid leave available to new parents is 
also controversial. The Chamber of Commerce filed suit in federal 
court arguing that the new regulations are not authorized by the 
federal statute.115 The Chamber of Commerce argued that the 
regulations put at risk a fund “that was set up for unemployed 
workers. At some point a recession is going to hit and there’s not 
going to be enough money for unemployed workers and people 
 
 112. SAMUEL ESTREICHER & MICHAEL C. HARPER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW 
GOVERNING THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP  928-35 (1990). 
 113. All but a few state unemployment funds have swelled from years of high employment. 
The combined holdings of all state funds doubled from 1992 to 1999. According to the U.S. 
Department of Labor, the District of Columbia’s fund grew by 1,2000%, Maryland’s by 458% 
and Virginia’s by 104%. Dale Russakoff, Clinton’s Push for Paid Parental Leave Falls Flat in 
States, WASH . POST., Aug. 1, 2000, at A2.  
 114. Birth and Adoption Unemployment Compensation, 64 Fed. Reg. 67,972 (1999) (to be 
codified at 20 C.F.R pt. 604) (proposed Dec. 3, 1999) (“We can do this in a way that preserves 
the soundness of the unemployment insurance system and continues to promote economic 
growth,” quoting President Clinton). The regulations also articulate that it is each State’s 
responsibility to assess the effect such changes would have on the solvency of its 
unemployment fund and the importance that states make “prudent” decisions prior to enacting 
Birth and Adoption Unemployment Compensation. 64 Fed. Reg. 67,978 (1999). See also, Alice 
Ann Love, Labor Department Sued Over Paid Leave, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, June 26, 2000; Birth 
and Adoption Unemployment Compensation, 65 Fed. Reg. 37,210 (2000) (to be codified at 20 
C.F.R. pt. 604). The regulations grant state agencies the opportunity to voluntarily choose to 
provide partial wage replacement to parents who take approved leave or otherwise leave 
employment after the birth or placement for adoption of a child. Citing the Department of 
Labor’s discretion to interpret the Federal Unemployment Compensation laws as legal authority 
to take such measures, the regulations give state agencies great latitude in the ability to 
determine eligibility criteria and benefit amounts and durations, should they choose to 
participate in this “experiment.” The only proscription is that participating states may not 
restrict eligibility in ways “inconsistent with Federal law.” Id. 
 115. This suit was filed in the District Court for the District of Columbia on June 26, 2000. 
The complaint and a press release are available from the National Chamber of Commerce 
Litigation Center, at http://www.uschambers.org/nclcl.  
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taking family leave.”116 On the other hand, many major newspapers 
editorialized in support of proposals to make unemployment 
compensation available to parents with new babies.117 The dispute 
also takes the form of conflicting estimates about the likely cost of 
such a program. The conservative Economic Policy Foundation 
estimates such programs would cost between $6.2 billion and $28.4 
billion.118 Advocates and legislators who support the idea estimate 
that costs are likely to be much more modest.119 
From a federalism point of view, this program appears sound. The 
federal action addresses a serious and well documented problem that 
states proved unable to solve. The federal rules facilitate state action 
 
 116. Love, supra  note 114.  
 117. See, e.g., Baby Benefits, BOSTON GLOBE, June 26, 2000, at A10 (urging state 
legislature to adopt a bill providing new parents twelve weeks of paid leave, up to 
unemployment’s maximum of $431 per week); Janet Stoodley, The Two Faces of the Family 
Medical Leave Act: It Has Been a Boon for Some, a Bust for Others, CHICAGO TRIB., June 25, 
2000, at 1 (supporting unemployment compensation funding for infant care leaves in an opinion 
story); Editorial, A Boost for Families, LOS ANGELES T IMES, July 3, 2000, at B6 (supporting 
unemployment compensation funding for infant care leaves).  
 118. The Economic Policy Foundation’s (EPF) projection is based on the assumption that 
every state will expand its UI program to provide parental leave benefits. In 1999, ten states 
were considering such a move, but many states are unlikely to do so. The EPF assumes that all 
states will offer either twenty-six or twelve weeks of parental leave. The EPF assumes that 
every eligible parent will take the full amount of time available. In reality many parents will 
take no leave and others will not be able to afford to take the full amount available. See 
NATIONAL PARTNERSHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES,  OVERESTIMATING THE COSTS OF 
PARENTAL LEAVE : FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS IN THE EMPLOYMENT POLICY FOUNDATION’S COST 
ASSESSMENT OF BIRTH AND ADOPTION UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION PROGRAMS 1 (2000), 
Letter from Unemployment Policy Foundation, to Unemployment Insurance Service Re: Notice 
of Proposed Rulemaking on Birth and Adoption Unemployment Compensation, January 26, 
2000, available at http://www.epf.org/documents/20000126.pdf.  
 119. A careful study, based on data about the use of unpaid family leave and survey data of 
people who say that they would take leave, if it were paid, estimates that in Massachusetts in 
1998 paid parental leave on the same terms as unemployment compensation would have 
covered 28,887 people at an annual cost of $32,735,000 or $10.81 per year per covered 
employee. RANDY ALBELDA & T IFFANY MANUEL, FILLING THE WORK AND FAMILY GAP 12 
(U. Mass., Labor Resource Center, 2000). Another careful study by New Jersey 
Assemblywoman Arlene Friscia estimates that in 1998 between 41,900 and 44,500 workers 
would have taken twelve weeks of subsidized leave to care for newborns and adopted children, 
as compared to 265,700 workers who received regular unemployment compensation. Gregory 
L. Williams, Estimate of Utilization and Cost of Family Leave Benefits Under Assembly Bill, 
No. 2037, 1-2 (N.J. 2000) (Gregory L. Williams is Senior Legislative Analyst to 
Assemblywoman Arlene Friscia). The annual cost of the birth and adoption program would 
have been between $95.1 million and $101.1 million, compared to $1,124 billion for regular 
unemployment compensation. Id.  
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by allowing states to use the unemployment compensation funds, 
however, states are not required to act. Individual states must make 
judgments based on state economic conditions, the status of the 
compensation fund, and other factors. This program comes at a time 
when we observe that, in supporting workers who have conflicting 
obligations to families even with the FMLA and the new 
unemployment compensation proposals, the United States does far 
worse than any other industrialized nation and worse than many less 
developed nations.120 Perhaps the pattern of success should cause us 
to challenge our basic assumption that family law is primarily a 
matter of state, rather than federal, responsibility. 
III. FEDERAL INTERVENTIONS IN FAMILY LAW THAT HURT FAMILIES 
This section examines two categories of federal interventions in 
state family law that appear to have done more harm than good. First, 
there are cases where federal law defines the financial consequences 
of marriage and divorce and the financial obligations of parents to 
children in ways that irrationally conflict with state rules. Second, 
there are federal interventions, and proposed interventions, that 
involve “hot button issues” that push the federal government to act 
without the necessary understanding of the larger context of 
relationships created under state family law. 
Federal law often allocates rights and responsibilities on the basis 
of legal status as a family member and relies on states to define 
marriage. For example, married people are entitled to claim federally 
financed Social Security and Medicare through their spouses.121 
 
 120. Until the FMLA, the United States was one of two industrialized countries (the other 
is South Africa) without national family leave. Many countries provide paid leave. For 
example, Greece and the Netherlands provide sixteen weeks at full pay; Italy provides twenty 
weeks at 80% pay. The European Community policy calls for a minimum of fourteen weeks 
with compensation at least equal to sick pay. See Joseph P. Allen, European Infant Care 
Leaves: Foreign Perspectives on the Integration of Work and Family Roles 270-71 in THE 
PARENTAL LEAVE CRISIS: TOWARD A NATIONAL POLICY  (Edward F. Zigler & Meryl Frank 
eds., 1988); Sabra Craig, Note, The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993: A Survey of the 
Act’s History, Purposes, Provisions, and Social Ramifications,  44 DRAKE L. REV. 51, 79 
(1995). 
 121. See Matthew R. Dubois, Note, Legal Planning for Gay, Lesbian, and Non-Traditional 
Elders, 63 ALB. L. REV. 263 (1999) [hereinafter Dubois]; Id. at 290 (Social Security retirement 
and disability benefits); Id. at 299 (Medicare). 
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Similarly, federal tax law treats married people differently than those 
who are single.122 Sometimes this federal tax policy benefits married 
people by allowing a high income and low income spouse to pool 
income and qualify for lower tax rates than the high income person 
would have alone; when both partners are high income earners the 
federal tax policy requires them to pay higher taxes.123 Again, for the 
most part, federal law does not define who is married, but rather 
relies in large part on states to do that job.124 Furthermore, though 
federal power over immigration is extremely broad, federal 
immigration law, with rare exceptions, relies on states to determine 
who is married.125 
Thus, while family legal status is often important to the 
determination of federal rights and responsibilities, the federal 
government usually does not attempt to define who is entitled to 
marry, the responsibilities of married people, or the terms and 
conditions of divorce. Rather, federal law relies on state 
determinations of marital status. This section considers situations in 
which federal law defines the legal consequences of family relation 
without reference to state law. 
 
 122. IRS Income Tax on Individuals, 26 C.F.R. § 1.1-1 (1999).  
 123. Dubois, supra  note 121, at 293-96. 
 124. Boyter v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue Service, 668 F.2d 1382, 1385 (4th Cir. 1981). 
The court recognizes that for federal tax purposes, state law determines whether people are 
married, except when the marriage is sham undertaken to avoid tax liability. The sham 
transaction doctrine may apply to the year-end foreign divorce of taxpayers who promptly 
remarry if:  
the underlying purpose of the transaction, viewed as a whole, is for the taxpayers to 
remain effectively married while avoiding the marriage penalty in the tax laws. It is the 
prompt remarriage that defeats the apparent divorce when assessing the taxpayers’ 
liability, just as the prompt reincorporation of a business enterprise in continuous 
operation defeats the apparent liquidation of the predecessor corporation. 
Id. at 1387.  
 125. See Adams v. Howeton, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1982). The court held that § 201 of 
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, as amended 8 U.S.C. § 1551(b) (1994), requires a 
two step process that first asks whether a marriage is valid under state law, and second, whether 
it qualifies under federal law. Id. at 1038. In the immigration context, a marriage valid under 
state law might nonetheless fail to confer preferred federal immigration status. Id. at 1039-40. 
“So long as Congress acts within constitutional constraints, it may determine the conditions 
under which immigration visas are issued. Therefore, the intent of Congress governs the 
conferral of spouse status under § 201(b), and a valid marriage is determinative only if 
Congress so intends.” 673 F.2d at 1039. 
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A. Thoughtless and Seemingly Irrational Federal Action on Family 
Finances 
1. Pensions as Marital Property 
Conflicts between state and federal treatment of pension 
distributions upon divorce provide a prime example of federal 
intervention that is damaging to families. For many families, pension 
benefits, along with the home and the automobile, are the most 
significant assets acquired during the term of the marriage.126 The 
policy and technical problems involved in the division of marital 
property, particularly pensions, are complex and the stakes are high. 
Clear and stable rules are essential to encourage negotiation and 
settlement in these stressful situations. States take divergent 
approaches to the division of marital property and pensions. Nothing 
in the legal and policy literature of family law suggests that any state 
has figured out a clearly preferable way to divide pensions, nor does 
this seem to be an issue, like child support enforcement, that suffers 
from neglect and lack of attention at the state level. 
In many situations, federal policy must address issues that impact 
the division of property at the time of divorce. For example, when 
Congress creates pension programs for military personnel or for 
railroad employees, obvious questions arise concerning the relation 
between federal pension law and state marital property law. Often the 
congressional approach to such a conflict was to shield the federal 
pensions or retirement benefits from distribution as marital property 
under state law.127 Similarly, when Congress regulates private 
 
 126. Marsha Garrison, Equitable Distribution in New York: Results & Reform , 57 
BROOKLYN L. REV. 621, 665 (1991). Because a smaller percentage of divorcing couples 
receive a pension than own a home, the family home is likely to be a couple’s most valuable 
asset. However, for couples who receive pension and retirement benefits, these earnings have 
the potential to become great, especially in a longer marriage, and may be the most valuable 
asset a couple owns. LENORE WEITZMAN, T HE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED 
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 55, 114 
(1985). 
 127. See Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 584-85, 590 (1979) (holding that a 
California rule stating that husband’s pension, earned during the term of the marriage, is 
community property subject to division is preempted by a federal rule prohibiting the alienation 
of federal railroad retirement pensions); McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 230 (1981) 
(California rule that nondisability military retirement benefits are community property divisible 
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pensions, as it has done extensively through the Employment 
Retirement Income Security Act,128 it sometimes ousts state law 
governing the distribution of marital property.129 
These federal interventions—removing federally regulated 
pensions from distribution as marital property under state law— were 
completely unjustifiable.130 This conclusion is supported by the fact 
that Congress subsequently revised federal policy in relation to 
railroad pensions131 and later retroactively revised the federal policy 
in relation to military pensions and benefits.132 Why did Congress 
adopt rules intervening in state family law in such significant and 
senseless ways? Two explanations seem plausible. First, the 
protection of pensions against distribution at divorce might have been 
motivated by sexism. Pensioners are more likely to be men and the 
spouses seeking distribution more likely to be women. Congress 
could have acted on the traditional belief that money belongs to the 
person who earns it,133 even though states have now uniformly 
 
at divorce is preempted by federal law, despite absence of clear statutory language). 
 128. 29 U.S.C. § 1101 (1994). 
 129. Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 844 (1997). The Court held, 5-4, that several 
provisions of ERISA regarding the distribution and non-alienation of pension benefits directly 
conflicted with, and therefore preempted, the application of Louisiana’s community property 
law to undistributed ERISA pension benefits. Justice Breyer, dissenting, observed: “Obviously, 
Congress did not intend to pre-empt all state laws that govern property ownership. After all, 
someone must own an interest in ERISA plan benefits . . .. The question, ‘who owns the 
property?’ needs an answer. Ordinarily, where federal law does not provide a specific answer, 
state law will have to do so.” Id. at 861. See also , Karen A. Jordon, The Shifting Preemption 
Paradigm: Conceptual and Interpretive Issues, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1149, 1181-1201 (1998). 
 Since 1995, the Supreme Court has reversed course and sharply restricted the sweep of the 
federal ERISA preemption of state law. N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield 
Plans v. Travelers Inc. Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995); N.Y. Comm’r of Health v. NYSA-ILA 
Medical & Clinical Services Fund, 520 U.S. 806 (1997); Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 
(2000). In re Egelhoff, 989 P.2d 80 (Wash. 1999), used these recent cases to reject a former 
wife’s claim that ERISA preempted a state law rule awarding her deceased ex-husband’s 
pension to his children. The state court distinguished Boggs.  
 130. In the pension cases, the Supreme Court shares responsibility for creation of the 
conflict between state and federal pension law. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, McCarty, 453 U.S. 
210, and Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, were all divided decisions in which the dissenting Justices would 
have interpreted the federal statutes more consistently with general state family law.  
 131. 45 U.S.C. § 231a(c)(4) (1994). 
 132. Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection Act, 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (1994). 
 133. For example, in Hisquierdo the Court observed: 
Congress has fixed an amount thought appropriate to support an employee’s old age. . . 
Any automatic diminution of that amount frustrates the congressional objective. [T]he 
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adopted a vision of marriage that treats assets acquired during the 
marriage as belonging to the marital community.134 A second possible 
explanation is that Congress simply did not confront the problem of 
federal pension rules and state marital property division. This is not 
surprising. Because family law is a matter of state law in most 
instances, Congress has had little reason or opportunity to develop 
expertise in it. 
2. Federally Subsidized Student Loans and Parental Child 
Support Obligations 
The pension cases are not unique examples of federal disregard of 
state family law. Federal rules for subsidized loans for college 
students take little account of state family law obligations. Federal 
rules assume that the income of custodial parents and stepparents is 
available to support college education. To qualify for federal loans, 
college students must submit their parents’ tax return. Loan 
authorities take parent’s income into account in determining students’ 
eligibility for federally subsidized loans.135 Further, in many schools, 
the federal financial aid application is the “gateway to applications 
for various types of aid.”136 Federal rules do not expect non-custodial 
parents to contribute to college education, and no information is 
required about them, whatever their ability to pay.137 
 
community property interest that respondent seeks . . . promises to diminish that 
portion of the benefit Congress has said should go to the retired worker alone, and 
threatens to penalize one whom Congress has sought to protect. 
439 U.S. at 585, 590. 
 134. While states differ substantially in the details of the rules for dividing marital 
property, all states now follow some form of equitable distribution under which title is not 
wholly determinative. See WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 39, at 650-55. 
 135. Applicants for Federal Student Aid must submit financial information on their parents, 
unless the student was born before Jan. 1, 1976, is working for a graduate degree, is married, 
has dependent children, or is a veteran. See APPLICATION FOR FEDERAL STUDENT AID, 4, 7, 
available at http://www.fafsa.gov; 20 U.S.C. § 1087kk (1994). 
 136. A senior Massachusetts family law judge and experienced practitioner observed that 
“the pervasive method for obtaining financial aid is to initially apply for federal loans by filling 
out a federal financial aid form.” Other sources of aid then rely upon this information. Edward 
M. Ginsburg & Anita Wyzanski Robboy, Support and Education after Age Eighteen, 10 MASS. 
FAM. L.J. 101, 104 (1993) [hereinafter Ginsburg & Robboy]. 
 137. Colleges, particularly private schools, expect that non-custodial parents will contribute 
to the cost of their children’s education. Linda Matthews, Divorced Father’s Case Raises 
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By contrast, under the family law of most states, parents, whether 
custodial or not, are not legally obligated to support their children 
beyond the age of eighteen.138 The minority of states that require 
parents to pay reasonable educational expenses until age twenty-one 
apply this obligation equally to custodial and non-custodial 
parents.139 Most states do not make stepparents legally responsible for 
the financial support of their stepchildren;140 the few states that 
impose support obligations on stepparents define those obligations 
more narrowly than obligations to biological children.141 An 
experienced Massachusetts family judge lamented that under the 
federal assumption of stepparent income, “the understandable and 
lawful refusal of a stepparent to disclose his or her financial 
circumstances may foreclose a child from any financial aid.”142 
Congress could resolve this conflict in several ways. Federally 
subsidized loan programs could be modified to take into account only 
that financial support to which a student is legally entitled or which 
he or she actually receives.143 This approach would respect state 
choice with respect to defining parental obligations to help with the 
educational expenses of children over eighteen. There is an obvious 
disadvantage to this strategy. If federal law were changed to tell 
parents and children that in most states parental support for college 
education is purely voluntary, undoubtably some parents, who now 
struggle to provide financial support, would decline to do so, 
knowing that children could borrow increased amounts of low 
interest, federally-subsidized loans. College education is expensive. 
In 1998 the average married-couple family in the United States 
 
Difficult Issues of Who Pays Tuition, N.Y. T IMES, Nov. 18, 1995, at B11.  
 138. WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 39, at 744. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 748. 
 141. Charles F. Willson, But Daddy, Why Can’t I go to College? The Frightening De-Kline 
of Support for Children’s Post-Secondary Education, 37 B.C. L. REV. 1099, 1104-12 (1996) 
[hereinafter Willson]. 
 142. Ginsburg & Robboy, supra  note 136, at 104. 
 143. A similar issue arose in relation to public assistance when state welfare authorities 
denied aid to children whose mothers had a boyfriend, even though the boyfriend did not in fact 
provide financial support and was not legally required to do to. In King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 
327 (1968), the Supreme Court held that the Social Security Act did not permit states to 
attribute income to a child unless the child was legally entitled to receive it, or it was actually 
provided.  
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earned $54,276.144 The average cost for one year at a private four-
year college, including tuition and living expenses, was $17,420. 
Changing federal policy to correspond to state law would require a 
vast increase in federal, as opposed to parental, contribution to the 
costs of higher education. 
Alternatively, Congress could require states to modify the parental 
support rules by amending the federal child support guidelines. If 
Congress assumes that the custodial parent’s income is available to 
support college education, the federal child support guidelines should 
be amended to require such support.145 
The disparity between federal assumptions about parental support 
for college education and state requirements is more than an issue of 
messy inconsistency. Both state and federal rules are gender biased in 
different ways. State rules are gender biased in that they do not 
generally expect parents to pay for college education even if they are 
able to do so. Custodial parents—overwhelmingly women—struggle 
to help their children take advantage of higher education.146 But, in 
most states, the law does not insist that non-custodial parents help. 
The federal rules are even worse. Even in states that require non-
custodial parents to help their kids with college expenses, the federal 
government does not require so. Further, even though few states 
require stepparents to support their stepchildren, federal law expects 
support from stepparents married to widowed or custodial parents. 
State law does not require stepparents to support their stepchildren 
because states want to leave adults free to marry, without taking on 
obligations to children.147 But under federal law, for custodial 
 
 144. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,  INCOME 1998, TABLE A, COMPARISON OF SUMMARY 
MEASURES OF INCOME BY SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS, available at http://www.census.gov/ 
flp/pub/hhes/income/income98/in98sum. 
 145. The simplest rule would simply require states to extend existing support obligations to 
children between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one enrolled in high school, college or 
vocational education programs.  
 146. After high school, many middle-class or wealthy non-custodial fathers cease financial 
support, main tain it at minimal levels, or attach burdensome strings. See Judith S. Wallerstein & 
Shauna B. Corbin, Father-Child Relations After Divorce: Child Support and Educational 
Opportunity, 20 FAM. L.Q. 109 (1986); See also  JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & SANDRA 
BLAKESL EE, SECOND CHANCES: MEN, WOMEN & CHILDREN A DECADE AFTER DIVORCE 157-
60 (1989). 
 147. Margaret M. Mahoney, Support and Custody Aspects of the Stepparent-Child 
Relationship , 70 CORNELL L. REV. 38, 45 (1984). 
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parents—almost all women—the price of remarriage is that the new 
husband is required to pay for the kids’ college education.148 By 
contrast, the non-custodial parent has no obligation under federal law 
or under the laws of most states. The stepparent who weds the non-
custodial parent has no obligation to pay. 
Apart from the inconsistency of state and federal expectations, 
and the gender bias that assumes that custodial parents and their new 
spouses will provide financial support, neither state nor federal law 
assure young people that they can look to their parents for financial 
support for college, even if the parents are able to pay. This is not 
necessarily a federalism problem, but it is troubling. 
Until the 1970s, many states required parents to support children 
until age twenty-one. When young men were drafted to fight the war 
in Vietnam at age eighteen, many people argued that people old 
enough to fight and die were old enough to vote. In 1971 the Twenty-
sixth Amendment to the Constitution lowered the voting age from 
twenty-one to eighteen.149 Whatever the logic of “old enough to fight 
and die means old enough to vote,” it is far from obvious that 
eighteen year olds are old enough to pay for their own college 
education. Nonetheless, most states responded to the Twenty-sixth 
Amendment by ending parents’ obligations to support their children 
at age eighteen. 
A few states continued a gender differentiated rule that required 
parents to support male children until age twenty-one and female 
children until age eighteen.150 In 1975 the Supreme Court explained, 
and rejected, the gender differentiated rule: 
No longer is the female destined solely for the home and the 
rearing of the family, and only the male for the marketplace 
and the world of ideas. . . . If a specified age of minority is 
required for the boy in order to assure him parental support 
while he attains his education and training, so, too, it is for the 
 
 148. Margorie Engel, Pockets of Poverty: The Second Wives Club—Examining the 
Financial [In]Security of Women in Remarriages, 5 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 309, 366 
(1999). 
 149. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1. 
 150. By 1975 only two states, Utah and Arkansas, fixed the age of majority for women 
younger than that for men. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 15 (1975).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
p175 Law.doc  3/22/01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
208 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 4:175 
 
 
girl. To distinguish between the two on educational grounds is 
to be self-serving: if the female is not to be supported so long 
as the male, she hardly can be expected to attend school as 
long as he does, and bringing her education to an end earlier 
coincides with the role-typing society has long imposed.151 
When the Court struck down the gender based rule, Utah 
corrected the disparity by lowering the age of required support from 
twenty-one to eighteen for all young people.152 Ironically, these two 
measures, designed to empower young people by giving them the 
vote and opening higher education for girls, had the practical effect of 
denying all young people the ability to look to their parents for 
financial support for higher education. 
In the twenty-first century in the United States, able young people 
need education beyond high school. They should be able to expect 
their parents to support them if the parents are financially able to do 
so. As a society we have not delivered on the Supreme Court’s 
recognition in Stanton that the “market place and the world of 
ideas”153 should be open to both men and women, and that higher 
education is essential to such participation and contribution. 
Congress should amend the child support guidelines to require 
states to extend child support obligations for both custodial and non-
custodial parents to age twenty-one for young people in accredited 
educational programs. Under state law, married people are not now 
legally required to provide more than minimal financial support to 
their children.154 On the controversial issue of stepparent liability for 
 
 151. Id. at 14-15. 
 152. Stanton v. Stanton, 429 U.S. 501, 501 n.2 (1977) (reviewing decision of Utah 
Supreme court after remand). 
 153.  421 U.S. at 14-15. 
 154. Current child support obligations apply only to families in which the parents are 
unmarried and do not live together. The assumption is that when a family lives together they 
typically share a standard of living; state involvement in enforcing support obligations in the 
context of an on-going family relat ion is seen as unduly intrusive on family privacy. McGuire v. 
McGuire provides the classic statement of the concept in the context of spousal support 
obligations. 59 N.W.2d 336 (Neb. 1953)  (showing that even though Mr. McGuire was quite 
wealthy, he was extremely stingy with his hard-working farm wife). Feminists have sharply 
criticized the rule that marital support obligations are enforceable only after separation or 
divorce. See, e.g., Nadine Taub & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Perspectives on Women’s 
Subordination and the Role of Law, in T HE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 151, 
155-56 (David Kairys ed., 1990). Even if the notion that support obligations should not be 
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the financial support of stepchildren, Congress should either amend 
the child support guidelines to require that stepparents support their 
stepchildren, or modify the federal college loan qualifications to 
eliminate the assumption that young people can look to their 
stepparents for financial support.155 As with the child support 
guidelines, there would continue to be disputes about the application 
of guidelines in particular cases, and it is sensible to allow state 
courts, who have all the experience in defining and enforcing support 
obligations, to continue to do that job. 
The current regime, in which federal law assumes that students 
can look to their custodial parent, most often mothers, for financial 
support for a college education and state law that says they cannot, is 
not defensible. In our federal system, states cannot change the federal 
policy. States could revise their own rules to bring support 
obligations into line with the expectations of federal financial support 
for higher education. But, consistent with the more general problems 
of the definition and enforcement of child support, states have shown 
little inclination to do so.156 Additionally, both the state and federal 
 
enforceable when a family shares a home is defensible, it is far from clear that the justifications 
apply to financial support for children’s higher education. In many cases, the child is no longer 
in the home. The educational accreditation process provides a means of defining institutionally 
valuable education, and the financial aid application process, including the federal loan 
programs, provide a mechanism for quantifying need and obligation. There would, of course, be 
disputes. However, these disputes would be similar to those now adjudicated by state family 
court judges in jurisdictions where separated parents are legally obligated to provide financial 
support for higher education for young people eighteen to twenty-one years old.  
 In Curtis v. Kline, 666 A.2d 265 (Pa. 1995), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a 
state law requiring divorced and separated parents to provide educational financial support for 
children age eighteen to twenty-one, but not imposing such obligations on married couples, 
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because there was no 
rational basis to distinguish between young people whose parents were married and those 
whose parents were divorced, unmarried or separated. But see LeClair v. LeClair, 624 A.2d 
1350 (N.H. 1993) (holding that the legislature could create educational support  obligations for 
separated parents of children eighteen to twenty-one because it could rationally conclude that 
these children are less likely to receive financial support from both parents).  
 155. The question of stepparent obligation is obviously extremely controversial, as 
exemplified by the fact that few states require stepparents to support their stepchildren. See 
Mahoney, supra  note 147. Perhaps this suggests a national consensus that stepparents should 
not be expected to support stepchildren and that federal rules should be changed to eliminate the 
requirement that stepparent income be taken into account in determining student eligibility for 
federally supported loans.  
 156. Willson, supra  note 141, at 1103-06. Washington and Iowa, for example, have passed 
legislation authorizing courts to order parental support for high school or college students.  
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rules are gender biased and fail to provide support to children whose 
parents are capable of supporting them. Congress could and should 
address this issue.157 
B. Federal Intervention on “Hot Button” Issues 
Another category of cases in which federal intervention in family 
law hurts families involves “hot button” issues; Congress seeks to 
“do something” without serious consideration of the impact of 
congressional action. The phenomena of symbolic congressional 
action on issues with popular political appeal is not confined to 
family law. The Gun-Free School Zones Act,158 which precipitated 
the Lopez decision that radically cut back on federal legisla tive 
power,159 is a good example. It is an exceptionally silly law. While no 
one could deny the problem of guns in schools or the importance of 
providing children a safe educational environment, the Gun-Free 
School Zones Act was not a serious response to the problems.160 
Criminal law, like family law, is basically a state responsibility. Most 
states have a raft of laws that prohibit guns in schools.161 So what 
does the federal Gun-Free School Zones Act add to this picture? It 
created a new federal cause of action.162 However, the Gun-Free 
 
 157. Even though the federal college loan program systematically disfavors women by 
requiring custodial parents, but not non-custodial parents, to support children in college, the 
possibility of a constitutional challenge is remote. Discriminatory effects, however dramatic, do 
not prove a violation of constitutional gender, or racial, equality norms. Personnel Adm’r. of 
Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979). Also, the Supreme Court has held that when the 
federal government spends money, it can penalize speech or choice that would otherwise be 
constitutionally protected. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 
297 (1980).  
 158.  18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1994). 
 159. See infra discussion in Appendix 1.  
 160. David B. Kopel, Children and Guns, in GUNS: WHO SHOULD HAVE THEM? 329-30 
(David B. Kopel ed., 1995); Laura Beresh-Taylor, Preventing Violence in Ohio’s Schools, 33 
AKRON L. REV. 311, 327 (2000) [hereinafter Beresh-Taylor]. 
 161. All fifty states mandate the immediate expulsion of students who posses weapons on 
school property. Beresh-Taylor, supra  note 160, at 323. See Thomas M. Mengler, The Sad 
Refrain of Tough on Crime: Some Thoughts on Saving the Federal Judiciary from the 
Federalization of State Crime, 43 KAN. L. REV. 503, 504 (1995). 
 162. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q). See also John M. Scott, Constitutional Law—Supreme Court 
Invalidates Federal Gun-Free School Zones Act, 18 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 513, 514 
(1995); Deanell Reece Tacha, Preserving Federalism in the Criminal Law: Can the Lines Be 
Drawn?, 2 FED. SENT. R. 129, 130 (1999). 
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School Zones Act did not appropriate funds, provide expertise in 
enforcing existing laws, reduce class room size, or, most importantly, 
control access to guns. Mostly the Gun-Free School Zones Act 
provided federal politicians an opportunity to stand up and say they 
supported gun-free schools. Immediately following the Lopez 
decision, the President reaffirmed his commitment to federal 
legislation on gun-free schools, observing, quite accurately, that 
Congress can reach the same result by attaching substantive 
provisions to federal funding for education,163 or by making the inter-
state commerce connection more explicit.164 
Family law presents federal actors many opportunities to “do 
something” about an issue of popular concern in the media . The 
remainder of this section considers two cases in which federal 
intervention in state family law seems unwarranted and unwise: The 
Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1984 (CAPTA) and 
the federal anti-gay Defense of Marriage Act. Each example raises 
consequential issues about which reasonable people disagree and in 
which state courts and legislatures are deeply involved. Federal actors 
are motivated by a desire to “do something,” but in both of these 
cases, it seems that federal intervention is either meaningless 
grandstanding or hurts, rather than helps, families. 
1. The Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1984 
Parents ordinarily decide what medical treatment is appropriate 
for their children. Parents have wide discretion to decide whether 
colds their children contract should be treated with antibiotics, 
homeopathic remedies, vitamin C, faith, or chicken soup. However, if 
the child’s condition is life threatening and doctors believe that 
treatment has a reasonable prospect of success, parents cannot reject 
 
 163. Todd S. Purdum, Clinton Seeks Way to Retain Gun Ban in School Zones, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 30, 1995, at A1.  
 164. Congress rewrote the law struck down in Lopez to require that the firearm near the 
school yard has “moved in or the possession of the firearm otherwise affects interstate or 
foreign commerce.” 141 CONG. REC. S6459-02 (daily ed. May 10, 1995). See also Kathleen F. 
Brickey, Symposium: The New Federalism After United States v. Lopez: Panel III: Crime 
Control and the Commerce Clause, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 801, 828-30 (1996); Robert Wax, 
Comment: United States v. Lopez: The Continued Ambiguity of Commerce Clause 
Jurisprudence, 69 T EMPLE L. REV. 275, 299 (1996). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p175 Law.doc  3/22/01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
212 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 4:175 
 
 
treatment. In every state, doctors can go to court to get an order 
declaring the parents neglectful for refusing to consent to medical 
treatment.165 For infants with serious disabilities, these choices are 
often gut-wrenchingly difficult and must be informed by particular 
facts, the fast moving state of technology at the treating hospital, and 
sharply divergent parental values. For example, some parents of an 
anencephalic infant—a baby with no brain—seek aggressive 
treatment even though it is certain to be futile,166 while other parents 
want the infant declared dead so that another child might benefit from 
healthy donated organs.167 For the most part it seems that doctors and 
parents act responsibly, and state courts intervene only when parents 
unreasonably refuse treatment.168 
In 1982, a baby in Indiana with Down’s syndrome, Baby Doe, 
suffered from an obstruction of the esophagus which precluded 
normal feeding, but was surgically correctable. On the advice of their 
obstetrician, the parents refused to consent to surgery. The hospital 
sought a court order to override the decision of the doctor and 
parents, and the court denied it.169 The baby died when he was six 
days old. The Indiana Baby Doe case was highly unusual and 
shockingly wrong.170 The case triggered calls for federal action to 
 
 165. Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108, 1117-18 (Del. 1991), provides a good review of 
the cases. When the parents refused treatment, the court rejected the doctor’s request to order 
invasive and painful chemotherapy for a seven-year-old child for whom treatment offered only 
a 40% chance of success. Id. 
 166. See In re Baby K., 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1994) (denying a hospital request to issue a 
“Do not Resuscitate Order” over the objection of the mother). 
 167. See In re T.A.C.P., 609 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1992) (denying parents’ request to have 
infant declared dead because no Florida law addressed the situation). 
 168. See Raymond F. Duff & A.G. Campbell, Moral and Ethical Dilemmas in the Special 
Care Nursery, 289 N. ENG. J. MED. 890 (1973) (detailed description of thoughtful decision 
making process at Yale New-Haven Hospital); Phoebe A. Haddon, Baby Doe Cases: 
Compromise and Moral Dilemma, 34 EMORY L.J. 545, 568 (1985) (discussing a tradition of 
preference for decentralized decision making in matters concerning the family and the 
appropriateness of state intervention only where parental decision making is contrary to the 
interests of the child); H. Lila Hubert, Comment, In the Child’s Best Interests: The Role of the 
Guardian Ad Litem in Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 531, 
535 (1994) (discussing case law limiting state interference with parental choice). 
 169. In re Infant Doe, No. 608 204-004A (Monroe County Cir., Apr. 1982) (declaratory 
judgment, writ of mandamus dismissed sub nom. State ex rel. Infant Doe v. Bloomington 
Hosp), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 951 (1983). 
 170. Dr. Norman Frost, discussing the Indiana Baby Doe case, says: “[t]here is a broad 
consensus in the United States that many of the decisions of under treatment in the past were 
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protect vulnerable babies.171 The Reagan Administration issued 
regulations requiring hospitals to post notices informing staff and 
patients that infants with disabilities, however severe, were entitled to 
a full range of treatment, whatever the judgments of parents and 
treating doctors, and that complaints could be filed with a 
Handicapped Infant Hotline.172 This initial federal effort had the 
immediate effect of transforming the small Office of Civil Rights of 
the federal office of Health and Human Services from an organization 
that dealt with a broad range of discrimination issues in health care to 
one with the single-minded focus of responding to Baby Doe Hot 
Line calls. The people who previously joined the office to fight broad 
patterns of discrimination in health care found themselves on the 
other end of a Hot Line to represent a nurse, aide, or visiting stranger 
who sought to overrule the judgments of responsible parents and 
competent doctors who decided that aggressive treatment was not 
warranted.173 The Supreme Court eventually held that these 
Executive initiatives were not authorized by statute.174 
Yet, Congress still wanted to “do something” about the problem. 
It passed the CAPTA.175 The federal standards are simultaneously 
 
morally wrong.” Norman Frost, Decisions Regarding Treatment of Seriously Ill Newborns, 281 
JAMA 2041, 2042 (1999). Dr. Frost also observes that “It is difficult to find a single case of 
withholding life-sustaining treatment from an infant based on a diagnosis of Downs syndrome 
or spina bifida since 1985.” Id. at 2041. 
 171. C. Everett Koop, Life and Death and the Handicapped Newborn, 5 ISSUES L. & MED. 
101, 110 (1989). 
 172. 48 Fed. Reg. 9630 (1983).  
 173. See PETER G. FILENE, IN THE ARMS OF OTHERS: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF THE 
RIGHT-TO-DIE IN AMERICA  119-24 (Ivan R. Dee ed., 1998). 
 174. United States v. Univ. Hosp., State Univ. of New York at Stony Brook, 575 F. Supp. 
607 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), aff’d. 729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984). This case began when a baby at a 
Long Island hospital was born with spina bifida. Id. at 610. After consultation with many 
doctors, family and religious advisors,  the parents, a Catholic couple who wanted a child, 
decided against surgical treatment. Id. Someone on the staff called A. Lawrence Washburn, a 
right-to-life attorney in Vermont, who filed suit in New York, seeking to be appointed guardian 
for the child. The New York courts rejected his petition. Id. HHS demanded the baby’s medical 
records and the hospital refused. Id. The Second Circuit held that the regulations were not 
authorized by the federal law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of disability. 729 F.2d 144. 
In Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass’n., 476 U.S. 610 (1986), the Supreme Court confirmed that 
the regulations were not authorized by the statute.  
 175. PUB. L. NO. 98-457, 98 Stat. 1749 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5106 
(1994)). The federal law requires states that receive federal assistance for child abuse and 
neglect programs take steps to protect handicapped infants. Treatment may be withheld only 
when: 
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rigid, imprecise and porous; it is not clear that they differ from the 
principles applied by the state courts that grapple with these awful 
conflicts.176 More significantly, CAPTA turns enforcement of these 
standards over to the state agencies and courts that have always done 
just that.177 Congress “did something” but it did not change either the 
state developed substantive standards or processes in any significant 
way. 178 Some doctors now assert that the federal law and the threat 
of prosecution leads them to provide care that they believe is futile 
and that the parents do not want, while others recognize that they are 
not legally compelled to do this and that there is no realistic threat of 
prosecution.179 
Despite the CAPTA having little or no formal impact, practices in 
neo-natal intensive care units have changed dramatically in the past 
two decades. Extremely small infants are treated much more 
aggressively,180 and parents who believe that treatment is futile and 
cruel have less say in determining what treatments their infants 
 
in the treating physician’s or a physician’s reasonable medical judgment . . .: A) the 
infant is chronically and irreversibly comatose; B) the provision of such treatment 
would—(i) merely prolong dying; (ii) not be effective in ameliorating or correcting all 
of the infant’s life-threatening conditions; or (iii) otherwise be futile in terms of 
survival of the infant; or C) the provision of treatment would be virtually futile in 
terms of the survival of the infant and the treatment itself under such circumstances 
would be inhumane. 
42 U.S.C. § 5105g(10) (1994). 
 176. Whether one of the exceptions applies is determined solely on the basis of “reasonable 
medical judgment,” which implemented regulations define as “medical judgment that would be 
made by a reasonably prudent physician, knowledgeable about the case and the treatment 
possibilities with respect to the medical conditions involved.” 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15(3)(ii) 
(2000). 
 177. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(10)(C) (1994). 
 178. Mary A. Crossley observed: “In marked contrast to the flurry of regulatory and 
judicial activity spawned by HHS’s attempts to regulate selective nontreatment under section 
504, the Child Abuse Amendments of 1984 have faced no judicial challenges and have 
generated little litigation.” Mary A. Crossley, Of Diagnoses and Discrimination: 
Discriminatory Nontreatment of Infants with HIV Infection,” 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1581, 1615 
(1993).  
 179. Gina Kolata, Parents of Tiny Infants Find Care Choices Are Not Theirs, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 30, 1991, at A1. 
 180. JEFF LYON, PLAYING GOD IN THE NURSERY  116 (1995) (describing the recent trend 
toward more treatment while acknowledging the danger of doctors trying to salvage newborns 
whose prognosis is poor). 
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receive.181 Many factors encourage increased treatment for infants 
with serious problems. Continuing development of knowledge and 
technology makes it possible to treat infants who would not have 
survived a decade ago and motivates doctors to treat infants more 
aggressively.182 Perhaps social recognition of the worth of people 
with serious disabilities is growing.183 In addition, insurance covers 
the cost of care, including experimental treatments.184 
What has the federal CAPTA accomplished? As a formal matter, 
it seems that CAPTA did nothing, which is preferable to the Reagan 
Administration’s earlier efforts to mobilize federal lawyers to insist 
on full treatment for all infants, however futile. Meaningless federal 
action is better than actions with serious negative consequences. Still, 
meaningless federal intervention into state law and practice is not a 
good idea. Further, it is not clear to what extent the lingering effects 
of the federal law encourage doctors to provide aggressive treatment 
against their own better judgments and the decisions of parents. 
2. The Defense of Marriage Act 
Many gay and lesbian people in committed relationships seek to 
be married.185 In 1993, the Hawaii Supreme Court held that state law 
limiting marriage to couples that included a man and a woman 
 
 181. Kolata, supra  note 179, (quoting Dr. Norman Frost, a pediatrician and ethicist from 
the University of Wisconsin: “We have reversed ourselves 180 degrees,” from allowing parents 
to participate in decisions to a situation in which doctors decide). See also Anna Quindlen, The 
Littliest Patients, N.Y. T IMES, Jan. 29, 1992, at A1. 
 182. Kolata, supra  note 179 (quoting Dr. Norman Daniels of Tufts University: “People get 
driven by their desire to solve a problem.”). See also ROBERT F. WEIR, SELECTIVE 
NONTREATMENT OF HANDICAPPED NEWBORNS: MORAL DILEMMAS IN NEONATAL MEDICINE 
34-35 (1984). 
 183. MELVIN I. UROFSKY, LETTING GO: DEATH , DYING, AND THE LAW 116-17 (1993). 
 184. Elisabeth Rosenthal, As More Tiny Infants Live, Choices and Burden Grow, N.Y. 
T IMES, Sept. 29, 1991, at 1-1. Neo-natal intensive care for very low birth weight babies costs an 
average of $2,000 a day. Id. Premature infants stay in intensive care for about the same amount 
of time they would have remained in their mother’s wombs, or four months for the most 
premature. Id. Many of these small infants suffer serious brain damage and stay in the intensive 
care unit for months or even years. Id. The neo-natal intensive care units are over crowded and 
must some times turn away new patients, for whom treatment is less likely to be futile. Id. 
 185. See William B. Rubinstein, Divided We Litigate: Addressing Disputes Among Group 
Members and Lawyers in Civil Rights Campaigns, 106 YALE L.J. 1623 (1997) (summarizing 
disputes among gay and lesbian advocates about whether access to marriage is an important 
issue for gay and lesbian people). 
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violated the state constitutional prohibition against discrimination on 
the basis of gender, just as earlier state rules prohibiting marriages 
between Blacks and whites violated the federal constitutional 
prohibition against race discrimination.186 In response to this decision 
and the general effort by committed gay and lesbian couples to 
marry, Congress adopted the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) in 
1996.187 
DOMA has two parts. First, DOMA affirms state authority to 
decide whether to recognize the validity of a marriage that was valid 
in another state.188 This provision simply confirms traditional legal 
rules. The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution189 always 
has been interpreted to allow states to decide whether to recognize 
the validity of marriages that were legal where contracted.190 The 
1971 Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws says: “A marriage 
which satisfies the requirements of the state where the marriage was 
contracted will everywhere be recognized as valid unless it violates 
the strong public policy of another state which had the most 
significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage at the time of 
 
 186. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). In 1997 the Hawaii legislature proposed a 
constitutional amendment providing: “The legislature shall have the power to reserve marriage 
to opposite-sex couples.” H.R. 117, 19th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1 (Haw. 1997). The amendment 
was ratified by the electorate in November 1998. The Hawaii Supreme Court held that the 
amendment made plaintiffs’ claims moot. Baehr v. Miike, 994 P.2d 566 (Haw. 1999). Hawaii 
also adopted a Reciprocal Beneficiaries Act recognizing same-sex civil unions. W. Brian 
Burnette, Hawaii’s Reciprocal Beneficiaries Act: An Effective Step in Resolving the 
Controversy Surrounding Same Sex Marriage, 37 BRANDEIS L.J. 81 (1998). 
 187. Defense of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738(c) (Supp. IV 1998).  
 188. The Act contains the following provision: 
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall be required 
to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State, 
territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex 
that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, possession, or 
tribe, or a right to claim arising from such relationship.  
Id. 
 189. “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and 
judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the 
Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.” 
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.  
 190. Linda J. Silberman, Can the Island of Hawaii Bind the World? A Comment on Same-
Sex Marriage and Federalism Values in Symposium: The Interstate Effects of Legalizing Same-
Sex Marriage, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 191, 193 (1996).  
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the marriage.”191 The issue arises in many contexts. For example, if 
second cousins get married in Italy, where their marriage is 
legitimate, should the marriage be valid in Connecticut, which 
prohibits marriages between second cousins? Connecticut said no.192 
Several states, such as California, adopted rules stating that any 
marriage valid in the place contracted is valid in their state.193 Other 
states take a more restrictive approach and refuse to recognize 
marriages that violate a strong public policy of the state. 194 
States have always been free to decide whether a marriage valid in 
the state in which it was contracted violates a “strong public policy” 
of another state. So what does this provision of DOMA accomplish? 
If same-sex marriages were legal in Hawaii and a couple married 
there, New York or Alabama has always been free to decide whether 
that marriage violated a “strong public policy” of that state. 
Substantively, the federal DOMA law does nothing. It simply 
affirmed the status quo. Nonetheless, symbolically, it sends a strong 
message. Congress singles out gay marriages, distinguishes them 
from teen marriages or cousin marriages, and affirmed that states 
have authority to condemn them as illegitimate.195 While the 
 
 191. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 283(1) (1971). My colleague, Professor 
Larry Kramer, argues that the public policy exception, allowing states to refuse to recognize the 
validity of marriages, legal where celebrated, on the grounds that they violate a strong public 
policy of the state, is unconstitutional. Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, 
and the Unconstitutional Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965 (1997). As Kramer 
recognizes, his view is eccentric: “The principle claim of this Article—that the public policy 
doctrine violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause—may elicit patronizing chuckles from some 
conflicts scholars.” Id. at 2007. 
 192. For example in Catalano v. Catalano, 170 A.2d 726 (Conn. 1961), the Connecticut 
Supreme Court refused to recognize the marriage of a half-uncle and niece, even though the 
marriage was legal in Italy, where it was celebrated, the couple had obtained the permission of 
the Catholic Church, had lived as man and wife in Connecticut for 40 years and had produced 
four children.  
 193. CAL. FAM. CODE § 308 (West 1994) provides that “A marriage contracted outside this 
state that would be valid by the laws of the jurisdiction in which the marriage was contracted is 
valid in this state.” See also Sandra Cavazos, Harmful to None: Why California Should 
Recognize Out-of-State Same Sex Marriages Under its Current Marital Choice of Law Rule, 9 
UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 133, 150 (1998); Thomas M. Keane, Aloha, Marriage? Constitutional 
and Choice of Law Arguments for Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages, 47 STAN. L. REV. 499, 
525-26 (1995). Seventeen states in addition to California have statutory rules requiring 
recognition of marriages valid where contracted. Id. at 516. 
 194. Supra  note 190-92. 
 195. Silberman, supra  note 190, at 197-99. 
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provision effectuates no concrete practical change in the law, it does 
send a powerful message that Congress regards same-sex marriage as 
uniquely illegitimate. The central purpose of the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause of the constitution is to encourage states to respect the rules 
and judgements of sister states. Section 1 of DOMA represents the 
first time in U.S. history that Congress spoke out in support of state 
disregard of another state’s laws.196 
The second part of DOMA is even more serious. It provides that 
for purposes of federal benefits, including taxes, Social Security, and 
other federal benefits, the terms “marriage” and “spouse” include 
only the union of a man and a woman.197 Thus, even if an individual 
state decides to legalize gay marriage, these couples, legally married 
in their state, will not be entitled to benefits available to married 
people under federal law. In 1999, the Vermont Supreme Court held 
that under the state constitution, the state must allow gay couples 
access to the material benefits comparable to those provided to 
heterosexual couples; the court declined to grant gay couples the right 
to marry.198 The Vermont legislature approved a bill to enable gay 
couples to form “civil unions” that would entitle them to the rights 
and benefits available under state law to married couples.199 
Beginning on July 1, 2000 gay couples in Vermont affirmed their 
commitment to a civil union.200 Still, many of the most important 
material benefits of marriage—federal taxes and pensions—are a 
matter of federal law. DOMA prevents Vermont from granting gay 
couples these federal benefits. 
This second DOMA provision is unprecedented. There is no 
general federal law of marriage. In a vast range of contexts, the 
 
 196. Susan Frelich Appleton called this point to my attention.  
 197. DOMA provides: 
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or 
interpretation of various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, the 
word “marriage” means only a legal union between one man and one woman as 
husband and wife and the word “spouse” refers only to a person of the opposite sex 
who is a husband or a wife. 
 198. Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).  
 199. H.B. 847, 2000 Gen. Assem. Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2000). 
 200. Associated Press, Civil Unions Law Goes into Effect, July 1, 2000, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/a/ap-Civil-Unions-The-First. 
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federal government relies on states to define who is, and who is not, 
married.201 Section 2 of DOMA creates practical problems for states. 
For example, under Vermont’s Civil Union law, a couple seeking to 
separate is subject to the same law applicable to married people who 
divorce.202 When married people divorce, the impact of federal tax 
laws is a major factor in determining the financial terms of 
settlement.203 State family courts and family law practitioners are 
familiar with these rules and routinely use them in reaching 
settlements. There is no way of knowing the federal tax rules 
applicable to civil union couples who separate; the issue is certain to 
be a matter of controversy and litigation. 
The problem with DOMA’s federal intervention is not a slippery 
slope. It seems highly unlikely that Congress is about to impose 
federal rules defining the legitimacy of marriage between minors or 
cousins. Rather, the problem is that Congress has singled out gay and 
lesbian people and expressed its animosity toward them by applying 
unique and disfavorable principles of state and federal law to them. In 
Romer v. Evans, the Supreme Court struck down a Colorado 
constitutional amendment that prohibited states and localities from 
providing civil rights protection to gay and lesbian people.204 While 
the meaning of Romer is far from clear, it is possible that DOMA 
violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection by singling 
 
 201. Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Extraterritorial Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage: When 
Theory Confronts Praxis, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1, 7, 8 & n.23 (1996) (“Under the law and 
custom that preceded DOMA, the federal government generally defined marriage with 
reference to state law. DOMA deviates entirely from this pract ice and in a very real sense 
compromises the power of the various states to regulate marriage.”). Evan Wolfson & Michael 
F. Melcher, Constitutional and Legal Defects in the “Defense of Marriage” Act, 16 
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 221, 233-34 (1996), observes that:  
most federal statutes do not define domestic relations terms (especially terms such as 
‘spouse’, ‘husband,’ or ‘wife’), and courts have generally found that Congress 
intended such terms to be defined by reference to state law (even with disparities from 
state to state). This policy—followed by Congress for more than two hundred years—
is not simply a result of deference, but rather is part of our system of federalism.  
 202. See supra  note 199, at Section 3. 
 203. Under federal law, alimony or spousal support is fully taxable to the person who 
receives it, I.R.C. § 71 (West Supp. 1996), and fully deductible to the person who pays, I.R.C. 
§ 215 (West 1994). By contrast, child support payments are nontaxable and nondeductible. 
I.R.C. § 71(c).  
 204. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
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out gay people for disfavorable treatment.205 Whether or not DOMA 
is constitutional, it seems gratuitous and terribly unwise. 
IV. WHAT GENERAL PRINCIPLES CAN WE DERIVE FROM THIS 
EXPERIENCE? 
When, as a general matter, should the federal government 
intervene to set national family law policy? The proceeding 
discussion suggests several principles. 
The common assumption that family law is necessarily and 
inherently a matter of state rather than federal law is false. Federal 
intervention in state family law is pervasive. In some situations, such 
as the distribution of federally funded pensions and student loans, 
federal intervention is inevitable, and the only choice is whether to 
defer to state law or to establish new federal rules. In other situations, 
such as child support enforcement, federal intervention is not 
inevitable, but is nonetheless very common. At the same time, states 
retain primary responsibility for articulation of rules governing 
family relations and administering the law in complex and common 
family conflicts. These patterns suggest that federal actors should be 
cautious in intervening in state family law. Because federal actors 
typically lack rich knowledge and experience with family law issues, 
they should act only with circumspection and after careful study. 
However, these patterns do not imply that federal authorities should 
never act. 
Federal policies in relation to the definition and enforcement of 
 
 205. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court 1995 Term Forward: Leaving Things 
Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 97 & n.492 (1994) (suggesting that DOMA violates equal 
protection and the “impermissible selectivity” principle of Romer); Mark Tanney, The Defense 
of Marriage Act: A “Bare Desire to Harm” an Unpopular Minority Cannot Constitute a 
Legitimate Governmental Interest, 19 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 99, 143-46 (1997) (suggesting that 
DOMA violates the constitutional principles of due process and equal protection); Andrew 
Koppelman, Dumb and DOMA: Why the Defense of Marriage Act is Unconstitutional, 83 IOWA 
L. REV. 1 (1997) (suggesting the same); Kafahni Nkrumah, The Defense of Marriage Act: 
Congress Re-Writes the Constitution to Pacify its Fears, 23 T HUR. MAR. L. REV. 513 (1998) 
(same); Bradley J. Betlach, The Unconstitutionality of the Minnesota Defense of Marriage Act: 
Ignoring Judgments, Restricting Travel and Purposeful Discrimination, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. 
REV. 407, 447-55 (1998). But see Jeffrey L. Rensberger, Same-Sex Marriages and the Defense 
of Marriage Act: A Deviant View of an Experiment in Full Faith and Credit, 32 CREIGHTON L. 
REV. 409, 418 (1998). 
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child support obligations provide a prime example of justifiable 
federal action and underscores the factors that make federal action 
sensible. First, there was, and still is, a broad national commitment to 
the general policy proposition that parents should support their 
children, even if they are not living with them.206 Second, there was 
widespread and well documented evidence that most states were 
performing poorly in defining appropriate levels of child support and 
enforcing ordered support.207 This was not a situation in which 
Congress was reacting to an individual horror story that may or may 
not reflect a larger problem. Third, a wide, informed consensus 
developed that alternative means of defining and enforcing child 
support payment would meet deeply shared social goals more 
effectively.208 Many of these alternatives were pioneered and tested 
by individual states.209 Finally, federal action in this area respected 
state experience and diversity by allowing states to fashion their own 
child support definitions and enforcement programs within a range of 
alternatives reasonably calculated to achieve the deeply shared 
federal goals. Some of the federal child support enforcement reforms 
could only be adopted at the federal level; for example, the 
interception of federal tax refunds.210 Nonetheless, the federal action 
on child support definitions and enforcement goes far beyond the 
above example and suggests that federal intervention may be justified 
in situations where states could act without federal prodding. 
The Birth and Adoption Unemployment Compensation 
regulations are similar in that they respond to a problem that is 
widely acknowledged and that states have proven unable to 
address.211 Like child support enforcement, we know that the 
problems confronting working parents with infants are not 
idiosyncratic or rare. However, this federal intervention differs from 
child support definition and enforcement policies in that there is 
substantial opposition to the claim that society should do more to 
enable working parents to care for newborns. While no one is against 
 
 206. See supra  note 50 and accompanying text. 
 207. See supra  notes 54-68, 75, 76 and accompanying text. 
 208. See supra  Part II. 
 209. See supra  note 71. 
 210. Supra  note 72. 
 211. See supra  notes 104-14 and accompanying text. 
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mothers and babies, significant business interests oppose the use of 
unemployment compensation funds for these purposes.212 
The cases of federal pensions and student loans suggest another 
set of principles. Federal benefits and responsibilities often turn on 
legally recognized family status. For the most part, federal actors 
appreciate that there is no general federal family law and rely upon 
state law to determine who is married and who owes financial 
obligations to whom.213 When federal law relies upon state 
determinations to determine federal family rights and responsibilities, 
policy remains responsive to changing social circumstances 
addressed by changes in state law. Sometimes, as in the cases of 
federal pensions and student loans,214 Congress creates family law 
rules that conflict with common state standards. The point is not that 
Congress lacks power to supercede state family law rules or even that 
such federal preemption is always unwise. The principle urged here is 
more modest. Federal actors should be conscious of the fact that, as a 
general matter, state law defines family relations and federal 
authority is the exception rather than the rule. In departing from state 
rules, federal actors should at least ask whether there is a good 
federal reason to reject the policies adopted by the states. Further, 
federal actors should assure that the new federal rules are grounded in 
general family law context. For example, if Congress wants to require 
that stepparents provide financial support for the college education of 
their stepchildren, it should impose an obligation on stepparents and 
not simply a penalty on the stepchildren. 
CAPTA presented issues dramatically different from child support 
and enforcement. First, CAPTA does not reflect any national 
consensus.215 To be sure, there was, and is, a broad consensus that the 
parents, doctors, and courts were wrong in the Indiana Baby Doe 
case—infants with Down’s Syndrome should not be denied ordinary 
medical care essential to preserve life.216 However, there was no 
evidence that the Indiana Baby Doe case presented a common 
 
 212. See supra  note 109 and accompanying text. 
 213. See supra  notes 121-25 and accompanying text. 
 214. See supra  text accompanying notes 126-48. 
 215. See supra  notes 175-79 and accompanying text. 
 216. See supra  note 169 and accompanying text. 
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problem. The federal debate and CAPTA addressed issues much 
broader than those raised by the Indiana Baby Doe case. Furthermore, 
there was no reason to believe that the solution imposed by CAPTA 
was superior to those developed by states in adjudicating these 
overwhelmingly difficult issues. The fact that, in the end, federal law 
turned the issue back to state control underscores that Congress did 
not find a new or better standard or process. In short, this history 
suggests Congress resist the impulse to “do something” about current, 
trendy, or sexy topics. Family law is so popular in the media 
precisely because it engages passionate emotions on issues about 
which reasonable people can and do disagree sharply.217 Federal 
actors should resist the temptation to impose a uniform national 
answer, unless they are convinced that problems are common and 
that federal law offers a standard or process that might remedy state 
defects. 
DOMA also illustrates the danger of quick federal response to hot 
button issues. As noted, Section 1 of DOMA, confirming state 
authority to determine whether a marriage valid where celebrated 
violates the public policy of the examining state, does nothing as a 
practical matter.218 It does, however, reflect Congressional ignorance 
of basic principles of state family law, while gratuitously expressing 
unique federal disapproval of a particular form of marriage. The 
second section, providing that gay marriages will not be recognized 
for federal purposes, even if recognized by state law, reflects federal 
contempt for both homosexual people and for the ability of states to 
govern the most basic element of family law—the definition of 
marriage. There is no developed evidence that gay marriage presents 
a general problem that states have systematically failed to address. 
Because no state has recognized gay marriage, almost by definition 
there is no evidence of the impact, positive or negative, that such 
recognition would have. Given states’ vastly greater knowledge and 
experience in dealing with issues of marriage and family law, it is 
insulting to the states, as well as to gay people, for Congress to 
declare that federal law does not respect traditional state authority 
over the definition of marriage. In short, Section 2 of DOMA 
 
 217. See supra  notes 4-7. 
 218. See supra notes 194-95 and accompanying text. 
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addresses a problem that does not yet exist, expresses scorn for both 
gay people and state competence to act in an area traditionally left to 
state decision-making, and thoughtlessly creates many problems that 
Congress neither addressed nor anticipated. 
The principles offered here are modest. They are not crisp, 
precise, or rule -like. Their modesty derives from an empirical 
methodology.219 It is possible to produce cleaner rules by reasoning 
first from principles, and then deductively. However, starting from 
messy facts, appreciating that the universe of potentially relevant 
facts is infinite, that important decisions are made in fact selection, 
and that inferences are drawn, judgments must be tentative and 
modest. 
From a federalism point of view, a classic assumption of political 
science and the law is that the federal government has greater 
capacity than state or local governments to perform redistributative 
functions.220 In the United States, where family law is assumed to be 
a subject primarily of state authority,221 financial and social supports 
for families are weaker than in other developed nations.222 These two 
phenomena may be simple coincidence or the product of larger 
forces, but they may also be related. In countries where the federal 
government grapples with the day to day problems confronting 
families, it is possible that federal authorities develop a keener 
appreciation of the degree that lack of resources and difficulty in 
meeting conflicting obligations to wage work undermine family 
values. This appreciation may, in turn, produce more generous and 
sensitive programs of family and social support. 
 
 219. See supra  note 49 and accompanying text. 
 220. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.  
Each state has an interest in attracting the rich, who will pay taxes and create 
employment, and deflecting the poor, who will impose net cost. . . . National programs 
or minimum federal standards can stop such destructive competition. . . [Further], 
there are enormous disparities in wealth and income among the states, and only the 
federal government can effectively collect revenue and redistribute it from rich states 
to poor. 
Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Balance of Power Between the Federal Government and the States, 
in NEW FEDERALIST PAPERS 111, 114-15 (Alan Brinkley et al. eds., 1998).  
 221. See supra  notes 12-28 (assumption that family law is a state subject in the U.S.), notes 
32-35 (assumption that it is a federal subject in other countries).  
 222. See supra  note 120. See also  LAWRENCE MISHEL, JARET BERNSTEIN, JOHN SCHMITT, 
T HE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA , 1998-99, 369-89 (1999). 
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Finally, these principles have no direct relation to the questions 
asked in the constitutional cases about the power of Congress under 
the Commerce Clause, Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, or 
the Eleventh Amendment.223 Wise is not the same as constitutional. 
Many policies are stupid, but nonetheless probably constitutional. As 
suggested above, federal rules exempting pensions from state marital 
property distribution are unwise. However, they are not beyond the 
power of Congress. Similarly, federal student loan requirements that 
assume the availability of income to which the student has no legal 
claim appear unjust. However, these rules, too are probably within 
the power of Congress. Even very conservative judges would agree 
generally that the Constitution allows Congress to enact dumb laws, 
as well as wise laws. Nonetheless, the current Court’s push to limit 
congressional power may be driven, in part, by a sense that Congress 
is too often willing to act where it lacks knowledge, expertise, or an 
ability to affect positive change. Whether or not this is true, Congress 
could do better in deciding whether and when to regulate family law. 
 
 223. See infra  Appendix 1. 
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Appendix 1—Constitutional Restraints on Federal Power 
Since 1995 the Supreme Court, often in sharply divided decisions, 
has dramatically limited the power of Congress. First, the Court has 
circumscribed the power of Congress to act under its constitutional 
authority to regulate interstate commerce. Second, the Court has 
restricted the power of Congress to act pursuant to Section 5 to 
enforce the substantive requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Finally, the Court has expanded state immunity from federal actions 
for money damages, even where Congress makes plain that it seeks to 
create legally enforceable rights against states. 
A. Commerce Clause 
Since 1995, the Supreme Court has sharply limited the power of 
Congress to regulate interstate commerce. Article I, Section 8 of the 
Constitution gives Congress the authority to “regulate Commerce . . . 
among the several States.” Initially the Supreme Court, in an opinion 
by Chief Justice Marshall, interpreted this power broadly, allowing 
Congress to regulate commercial activity having any interstate 
impact, however indirect. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 
194, (1824). Until 1887, Congress rarely exercised this broad power. 
When Congress began to regulate interstate commerce, the Supreme 
Court applied formalistic distinctions, for example, between 
commerce and manufacture, or between production and trade, to limit 
the power of the Congress. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 3RD ED. 808-11 (2000) [hereinafter, TRIBE, 
2000]. In the 1930s, as the New Deal Congress sought to find 
national solutions to the Great Depression, the Court’s constraint on 
congressional power produced a national crisis. In 1937, the Supreme 
Court returned to the older view of broad congressional power under 
the Commerce Clause. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 
301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding the National Labor Relations Act); 
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118-119 (1941) (upholding the 
wage and hour provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act); Wickard 
v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 129 (1942) (upholding the application of 
wheat price controls as applied to grain grown for home consumption 
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because the cumulative effect may affect interstate demand). 
From 1937 until 1995, the Court never struck down an act of 
Congress for exceeding its powers under the Commerce Clause. 
Indeed because economic relations were increasingly national and 
global, and the lines between commercial and other activities so 
difficult to draw, some respected scholars urged the Court to 
renounce completely any role in policing the boundaries of the 
commerce power. JESSE H. CHOPER,  JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE 
NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 171-259 (1980). 
In 1995, for the first time in over half a century, the Court found 
that an act of Congress exceeded its power under the Commerce 
Clause. In United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), the Court 
held, 5-4, that Congress lacked power under the Commerce Clause to 
adopt the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 that made it a federal 
crime for any individual “knowingly to possess a firearm at a place 
that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a 
school zone.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A). The Lopez majority asked 
whether the federally prohibited activity “substantially affects,” 
rather than tangentially affects, interstate commerce. 514 U.S. at 564-
66. The Court also suggests concern about whether the underlying 
activity is “commercial” or “economic.” Id. at 567. 
In United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000), the Court, 5-
4, affirmed broad limits on the power of Congress under the 
Commerce Clause in striking down a narrowly crafted federal civil 
remedy for victims of gender-motivated violence. Even though 
Congress made careful legislative findings documenting the impact 
of violence against women on the economy, and the inadequacies of 
state remedies, the Court refused to defer to the congressional 
determination because of fear that “Congress might use the 
Commerce Clause to completely obliterate the Constitution’s 
distinction between national and local authority. . . .” Id. at 1752. The 
Court further observed that “[g]ender-motivated crimes of violence 
are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity.” Id. at 1751. 
“The Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly 
national and what is truly local,” and the Court identified criminal 
law and family law as inherently local. Id. at 1754. 
In the family law area, while most federal courts have held that 
the Commerce and Spending Clauses allow Congress to address 
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problems of child support enforcement, most recently the Sixth 
Circuit struck down provisions of the Child Support Recovery Act of 
1994 that authorized criminal prosecution of parents who willfully 
fail to pay support for a child in another state. United States v. 
Faasse, 227 F.3d 660 (6th Cir. 2000). 
B. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
In addition, the Court has limited the power of Congress to 
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. In City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 
U.S. 507 (1997), the Court held that the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (RFRA) exceeded the power of Congress under 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that “[t]he 
Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of this article.” RFRA was enacted in direct response to 
the Court’s decision in Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 
(1990). 521 U.S. at 512. In that case, the Court, 5-4, overruled the 
traditional principle that facially neutral rules may not be applied to 
impose substantial burdens on the free exercise of religion unless 
supported by compelling state interests. 494 U.S. at 886-87. Congress 
sought to reinstate the prior understanding of the First Amendment. 
In Boerne the Court held that Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not empower Congress to “enforce a constitutional 
right by changing what the right is.” 521 U.S. at 519. Because RFRA 
broadly changed the meaning of the free exercise clause in direct 
response to a Supreme Court interpretation, the Court held that 
“RFRA is so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive 
object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to 
prevent, unconstitutional behavior. It appears, instead, to attempt a 
substantive change in constitutional protections.” Id. at 532. The 
Court held that “[t]here must be a congruence and proportionality 
between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means 
adopted to that end.” Id. at 520. 
Boerne’s limit on congressional power under Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment might have been read as a response to an 
unusual situation in which Congress had acted openly and directly to 
reverse a Supreme Court interpretation of the Constitution, in 
violation of the core holding of Marbury v. Madison that the Supreme 
Court is the final arbiter of the meaning of the Constitution. 5 U.S. (1 
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Cranch) 137 (1803). However, subsequent decisions make plain that 
the Supreme Court believes that the power of Congress under Section 
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is sharply circumscribed. See Florida 
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank and 
United States, 527 U.S. 627, 639 (1999) (holding the federal Patent 
Act, which subjected States to patent infringement suits, was not 
appropriate legislation under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
because it does not meet the new standard of “congruence and 
proportionality”); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631, 
645 (2000) (holding that Congress lacks power, under Section 5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to prohibit age discrimination in 
employment). Even though the federal prohibition against age 
discrimination allowed employers to rely on age when it is “a bona 
fide occupational classification,” the Kimel Court held that “the 
substantive requirements the ADEA imposes on state and local 
governments are disproportionate to any unconstitutional conduct 
that conceivably could be targeted by the Act.” 120 S. Ct. at 645. 
United States v. Morrison confirmed and expanded the Court’s 
view that congressional power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment is strictly limited. 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000). The law 
challenged in Morrison created a federal cause of action against 
individuals who inflict gender-motivated violence. Id. at 1747-48. 
The Court observed that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits only 
state action denying people the equal protection of the laws. Id. at 
1755-56. Congress made extensive findings that gender bias in state 
court and prosecutorial systems necessitated a new federal cause of 
action against perpetrators of gender-motivated violence to remedy 
the states’ bias against women and deter future instances of 
discrimination in the state courts. Id. at 1755. Attorney generals from 
thirty-eight states supported the act in Congress and thirty-six states 
joined a brief supporting the law before the Supreme Court. 
Nonetheless, the Court in Morrison held that Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment did not authorize Congress to create a new 
federal remedy against gender-motivated violence. Id. at 1759. Even 
though four Justices dissented from Morrison’s holding that the 
Commerce Clause did not authorize Congress to adopt the Violence 
Against Women Act, no Justice dissented from the holding denying 
congressional power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
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to provide remedies for gender-motivated violence against women. 
Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal 
Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE 
L.J. 441 (2001). 
C. Sovereign Immunity 
In addition, the Court vastly expanded the immunity that states 
enjoy under the Eleventh Amendment, holding that Congress cannot 
make states subject to suits for money damages even when states 
violate federally recognized rights, such as the right to be free from 
discrimination on the basis of age. When Congress acts pursuant to 
its power to regulate interstate commerce, it may not enforce federal 
norms through private damage actions in either state or federal 
courts, even if Congress is perfectly clear in asserting that it intends 
to impose such remedies. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 
517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996) (holding that Congress lacked the power to 
remove States’ sovereign immunity); Kimel v. Florida Board of 
Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631, 641 (2000) (holding that the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act was not a valid exercise of 
Fourteenth Amendment powers and therefore could not abrogate the 
states’ sovereign immunity). 
In 2000, the Supreme Court was scheduled to hear arguments and 
decide two cases raising the question whether the Eleventh 
Amendment bars the application of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act to the states. On March 2, 2000, the parties settled the disputes. 
Advocates for people with disabilities feared defeat in the Court, 
while the defendants feared political embarrassment. One advocate 
for the disabled in the Florida case said, “It didn’t hurt that it was an 
election year. . . . [T]here were a lot of people who questioned Jeb 
Bush seeking to overturn George Bush’s greatest presidential 
achievement.” Joan Biskupic and Al Kamen, Two Appeals Involving 
Disabilities Act Voided: Settlements Preclude High Court Decisions, 
WASHINGTON POST, March 2, 2000, at A10. 
At the end of 2000 the Supreme Court considered the issue 
avoided earlier in the year, i.e. whether Congress may make the ADA 
applicable to states that discriminate against people with disabilities, 
in violation of federal law. The lower court found that Congress had 
enacted the ADA pursuant to its power under Section 5 of the 
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Fourteen Amendment, noting that the Supreme Court, in City of 
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985), had held that 
the disabled are protected against discrimination by the Equal 
Protection Clause. Garrett v. University of Alabama at Birmingham, 
193 F.3d 1214, 1219 (11th Cir. 1999). The circuit court reasoned that 
because the ADA was enacted pursuant to Section 5, rather than the 
Commerce Clause, and Congress has explicitly provided that it is 
applicable to the states, Alabama could not invoke sovereign 
immunity under Kimel. The Supreme Court granted review, 120 S. 
Ct. 1669, and heard oral argument on Oct. 11, 2000. Linda 
Greenhouse, Justices Consider Scope of the Disabilities Act, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 12, 2000, at A1. 
In the family law area, federal circuit courts have read these 
decisions to declare that the Family Medical Leave Act is 
unconstitutional, as applied to state employers. Sims v. University of 
Cincinnati, 219 F.3d 559, 566 (6th Cir. 2000); Hale v. Mann, 219 
F.3d 61, 69 (2nd Cir. 2000). Congress enacted the FMLA, and 
provided that it applies to state employees, pursuant to its power 
under both the Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and made plain that it intended to abrogate whatever 
immunity states might enjoy under the Eleventh Amendment. These 
two circuit courts held that, when acting pursuant to the Commerce 
Clause, Congress has no power to abrogate state immunity. Further, 
even if the FMLA is regarded as enforcing the Fourteenth 
Amendment by addressing problems of gender discrimination, it is 
unconstitutional because it lacks “congruence and proportionality 
between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means 
adopted to that end.” Sims, 219 F.3d at 562 (quoting Boerne, 521 
U.S. at 520). 
These new limitations on federal power are all interrelated, and 
they combine to substantially limit congressional power to act. The 
radical changes wrought by these recent decisions cannot be 
overstated, particularly in the short run; major federal programs have 
already been struck down or eviscerated. At the same time, many of 
the goals that Congress seeks to achieve can still be accomplished in 
other ways. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Federal Power, Undimmed, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1999, at A14. (arguing that even if states are 
immune from money damage claims, aggrieved parties may still seek 
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injunctive relief or the federal government may sue for money 
damages). On the immunity issue, I am less satisfied that alternative 
remedies are adequate. Even if the federal government can act to 
protect victims of discrimination on the basis of age or disability, the 
federal government does not have a good track record in enforcing 
individual claims of discrimination. Congress and public interest 
advocates appreciate that the individual right to sue is essential. Even 
when suits for injunctive relief are possible, individuals who are 
subject to discrimination are typically motivated to find a lawyer 
because of the possibility of receiving back pay, and lawyers are 
motivated to take such suits because of the possibility of attorneys 
fees. Rights without remedies are not rights. See supra notes 83-98 
and accompanying text. 
Even though the Court sharply constrained the power of Congress 
to act under the Commerce Clause and under Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, many of the goals Congress seeks to achieve 
may still be pursued through the federal spending power, if such 
goals are carefully cast as conditions on federal funding. South 
Dakota v. Dole , 483 U.S. 203 (1987), upheld a federal program 
withholding a percentage of otherwise available federal highway 
funds from states that failed to adopt a twenty-one year-old minimum 
drinking age, even though the regulation of alcohol is assigned to the 
states under the Twenty-first Amendment. The Court suggested that 
the spending power is subject to four restrictions. First, “the exercise 
of the spending power must be in pursuit of ‘the general welfare.’” 
Id. at 207. Second, if Congress conditions the states’ receipt of 
Federal funds, it “must do so unambiguously. . ., enabl[ing] the States 
to exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of 
their participation.” Id. (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. 
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)). Third, the conditions on federal 
grants must be related “to the federal interest in particular national 
projects or programs.” Id. Finally, conditions on spending may not 
violate other substantive constitutional norms. Id. at 208. The Dole 
Court also acknowledged that financial inducements offered by 
Congress may be “so coercive as to pass the point at which ‘pressure 
turns into compulsion.’” Id. at 211. 
The eight-hundred pound gorilla in the room is whether the Court 
will interpret the Constitution to restrict the power of Congress to act 
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under the spending power. For now, at least, the Court has not done 
so. Professor Laurence H. Tribe suggests that “the scope of the 
spending power would seem to extend to virtually any secular 
activity.” TRIBE, 2000, at 839. But see Lynn A. Baker, Conditional 
Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM . L. REV. 1911, 1916 
(1995) (arguing that the spending clause power should be re-
interpreted to prohibit “conditional offers of federal funds in order to 
regulate the states in ways [Congress] could not directly mandate”); 
Ann Laquer Estin, Federalism and Child Support, 5 VA. J. SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 541, 595 (1998) (arguing that Congress and the Supreme 
Court need to consider whether the allocation of family and policy-
making authority away from states is a sensible choice). 
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Appendix 2—Federal Constitutional Constrains on State Control 
of Family Law 
The Fourteenth Amendment places many limits on state authority 
to regulate family law. See Meyers v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) 
(recognizing parents’ right to teach children a foreign language); 
Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (recognizing parents’ 
right to send children to private schools); Moore v. City of E. 
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (recognizing the right of an extended 
family to live together); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) 
(striking down a state rule that denies marriage licenses to people 
with unpaid support obligations); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 
(1987) (striking a rule allowing prisoners to marry only with the 
permission of the superintendent of the prison). See also Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that compulsory school 
attendance laws may not be applied to Amish children after the 
eighth grade). 
The Constitution prohibits states from ordering family relations on 
the basis of race. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking 
down laws prohibiting Blacks and whites from marrying one 
another); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (overruling a state 
decision awarding custody to uninvolved father because mother had 
married a Black man). 
It also sharply limits the ability of states to allocate family rights 
and responsibility on the basis of gender. See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 
268 (1979) (holding that a state law providing that needy women may 
receive alimony, but needy men may not violates Equal Protection); 
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (holding it 
unconstitutional to require the mother, but the not the father to 
consent to adoption). But see Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) 
(denying father a veto in adoption in circumstances in which a 
mother would be allowed to prevent adoption). 
In addition, the Constitution limits the ability of the state to 
allocate children’s rights on the basis of parent’s marital status. See 
Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (holding that to denying a 
child the right to sue for mother’s wrongful death because she was 
not married violates equal protection); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 
(1973) (state may not grant marital children a statutory right to 
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paternal support while denying this right to nonmarital children). But 
see Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978) (holding that distinctions are 
allowed with respect to inheritance). 
The Court has also held that the Constitution prohibits state from 
terminating parental rights without demonstrating parental wrong-
doing by “clear and convincing evidence.” Santosky v. Kramer, 455 
U.S. 745 (1982) (in order to terminate parental rights the state must 
show parental wrong-doing or neglect by clear and convincing 
evidence). But see Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 
(1981) (holding that the Constitution does not require appointment of 
counsel for indigent parents in termination proceedings). 
Most recently, in Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000), the 
Supreme Court considered constitutional dimensions of state family 
law in the context of the rules applicable to child visitation disputes 
between parents and others. The case is described here in detail, both 
because it is recent and because it illustrates the complexity of the 
relation between state family law and constitutional norms. The Court 
filed six opinions, and except for Justice Scalia, it is difficult to say 
what the Court, or indeed, any individual Justice, held. For Scalia the 
case is easy: Because the constitution does not mention parents, it 
never protects parental rights. Id. at 2074. 
The mother, Tommie Granville, was willing to allow her two 
daughters regular visits with the parents of their father, who 
previously killed himself. 120 S. Ct. at 2057. The grandparents 
wanted more—two weekends a month and two weeks in the summer. 
Id. at 2058. The mother, and her new husband who adopted the girls, 
refused. Id. The grandparents sued. Id. at 2057. 
Currently, every state allows some non-parents to petition for 
visitation, even over the objection of a parent. Grandparents and 
former stepparents are the most common beneficiaries of these laws. 
Washington’s statute is unusually broad. “The court may order 
visitation rights for any person when visitation may serve the best 
interests of the child whether or not there has been any change of 
circumstances.” WASH REV. CODE § 26.10.160(3) (1994). See also 
Troxel, 120 S. Ct. at 2057-58. 
The trial court granted the grandparents’ petition, suggesting that 
the mother had the burden of persuading the trial judge that expanded 
visitation was not in the best interests of the children. Id. at 2058. The 
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Washington Court of Appeals, in a decision addressing the claims of 
several disputing families, reversed. Id. The Washington Supreme 
Court held that the state law swept too broadly. Id. at 2058-59. In 
addition, the state court held that interference with parental discretion 
could only be justified to prevent harm or potential harm to the child, 
and not simply on a showing that visitation was in the child’s best 
interest. Id. at 2058-59. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has great discretion in deciding the cases 
it will hear. Nothing compelled the Court to review this case, even if 
most Justices read the U.S. Constitution somewhat differently than 
the Washington state court. It is not the High Court’s job to fix all the 
mistakes of lower appellate courts, much less local trial courts. 
Indeed, four Justices said that the Supreme Court should have denied 
review, or simply affirmed the Washington decision. 120 S. Ct. at 
2065, 2068, 2075. All went on to say more. 
Several opinions reflect a laudable recognition of the diversity of 
American families. Justice Stevens called attention to “the almost 
infinite variety of family relationships that pervade our every-
changing society.” 120 S. Ct. at 2073. Similarly, Justice O’Connor 
noted that, “The demographic changes of the past century make it 
difficult to speak of an average American family. . . In 1996, children 
living with only one parent accounted for 28 percent of all children 
under age 18 in the United States.” Id. at 2059. 
The plurality opinion, written by Justice O’Connor, and joined by 
Justices Rehnquist, Ginsberg and Breyer, assumed the role of an 
intermediate appellate state court and ruled narrowly that, on the 
specific facts of the case, ordering more extensive visitation violated 
parents’ constitutional liberty in “the care, custody, and control of 
their children.” 120 S. Ct. at 2060. The plurality noted that the 
Washington statute is “breathtakingly broad,” and “contains no 
requirement that a court accord the parent’s decision any presumption 
of validity or any weight whatsoever.” Id. at 2061. The plurality also 
observed that there was no evidence that the mother was unfit, and 
that she was willing to allow some regular visitation with the 
grandparents. However, the Washington Supreme Court already 
reached this conclusion, albeit on broader grounds. It is unclear 
which factors the Supreme Court plurality regarded as critical, and 
they declined to review the principled constitutional law rulings of 
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the Washington Supreme Court. 
Justice Kennedy’s dissent is particularly critical of the 
Washington ruling that compelled visitation can only be supported by 
a finding of parental unfitness. 120 S. Ct. at 2077. He and other 
Justices sensibly observed that there are situations in which visitation 
over parental objection might be in the child’s best interest, even 
though the parent is fit and denial of visitation would not “harm” the 
child. Justices Kennedy and Stevens would remand to the 
Washington court in the hope that they might provide a construction 
of the statute that would avoid constitutional issues, even though the 
Washington court had already held that the “any person” language 
could not be construed to mean a more limited category of people. 
Justice Souter concurred, observing that the fact specific approach 
of the plurality provided no guidance to lower courts that decide 
these cases in a variety of contexts every day. He would have 
affirmed the Washington holding that the state law was 
unconstitutionally broad. 120 S. Ct. at 2067. 
Justice Stevens agreed with Justice Souter that the plurality’s “as 
applied” approach was untenable. However, in considering the statute 
on its face, he, along with Scalia and Kennedy, would reverse the 
Washington holding that a law granting “any person” the right to 
petition for visitation is unconstitutionally sweeping. Because some 
of those in the broad “any person” category may have legitimate 
claims, these Justices found that the mother could not “establish that 
no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.” 
Id. at 2070 n.6. Hence, they held that the statute could not be 
unconstitutional on its face. 
In short, the Court provided little guidance on whether or how the 
Constitution restricts state choice in setting the rules applicable to 
visitation disputes between parents and other adults who have close 
relations with their children. This result is probably wise. As Justice 
O’Connor observed: “Because much state-court adjudication in this 
context occurs in a case-by-case basis, we would be hesitant to hold 
that specific nonparental visitation statutes violate the Due Process 
Clause as a per se matter.” Id. at 2064. And, Justice Kennedy warned 
that “We owe it to the Nation’s domestic relations legal structure, 
however, to proceed with caution.” Id. at 2079. Given the complexity 
of these issues, the tradition of state responsibility, and the diversity 
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of American families, the Court was wise to avoid definitive 
proclamations. 
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